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This dissertation explores the penalty regime provided for in the Tax Administration Act, No 
28 of 2011 (‘the Admin Act’), and implementation thereof in certain circumstances and 
behaviour on the part of the taxpayer.   
Even though the Admin Act has been in force for some years already, it remains necessary 
and relevant to explore the penalty regime that is operative to understand and confirm the 
scope and application thereof in various circumstances.  As one discusses the different types 
of penalties chargeable in terms of the Admin Act it becomes evident how sternly it can be 
applied.  Furthermore, the dissertation investigates how burdensome the regime can be and 
what remittance regime is available to taxpayers if they are penalised.     
This dissertation attempts to define what the objects of the Admin Act’s penalty regime are, 
and to determine whether these objectives are being achieved with the application of the 
penalty regime that is currently operative in the Admin Act.  It also considers whether the 
identified objects of the Admin Act’s penalty regime accord with the doctrine of punishment.   
It is imperative that legislation is aligned with the objective of the penalty regime as 
misalignment will prejudice taxpayers, whilst potentially derogating from the purpose that 
the legislation seeks to achieve.     
In this dissertation, the crux of the penalty regime is investigated and highlighted.  It also 
endeavours to assess the powers entrenched in the Admin Act and the need for clarification 
on a few uncertainties.  
The findings of this research study have revealed that: 
 The enactment of the penal provisions in the Admin Act only partially achieves the 
philosophy of the doctrine of punishment and,  
 In instances where the penal provisions do achieve the objects of punishment, it 
appears that the application thereof is not consistently applied in practice.   
The penal levying system in the Admin Act has been an improvement on the past penalty 
provisions as is evident in Chapter 3.  However, despite the more favourable and fair 
outcome achieved by the penal provisions in the Admin Act, the research concludes that 
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more specific guidance and measures in respect of the application of the penal provisions 
are necessary.  The behaviours listed in the understatement penalty percentage table are 
not defined and creates the need for further improvement. Though changes have been 
made since the implementation thereof it still requires further revisions. 
In respect of inconsistent application of the penal provisions in practice it is recommended 
that the administrators of the legislation be better equipped in respect of the application 
of the penal provisions or that the processes should be changed to address the 
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CHAPTER 1:  
1.1 Background  
To examine the penalty regime that exists in the Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 (“the 
Admin Act”)1 of South Africa, it is necessary to examine the meaning and purpose of the 
doctrine of punishment in general. 
Punishment can be defined as a punitive act carried out upon a person for breaching rules or 
commands enforced by a legal system.2   
There are five elements to define a standard case of punishment:3 
 It must involve consequences normally considered unpleasant; 
 It must be for an offence that breached legal rules; 
 It must be for an actual offender for his offence; 
 It must be intentionally administered by human beings’ other than the offender; 
 It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system 
against which the offence is committed. 
We use the term penalties for the offences that taxpayers commit by not adhering to or 
breaching the “rules” as laid out in legislation in the tax context, such as late payment of taxes 
or non-submission of annual income tax returns. 
                                                          
1 The Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 
2 Others have defined punishment as follows:  Flew, A.G.N. 1954. The Justification of Punishment.  Philosophy. 
29 at 291-307 defined punishment as Punishment “... the infliction of hard treatment by an authority on a 
person for his prior failing in some respect (usually an infraction of a rule or command)”. 
 Grotius, H. The infliction of an ill suffered for an ill done. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, ch. Xx, De Poenis. Vol. ii: p. 240. 
 Walker, N. Oxford Paperbacks Oxford University Press defines punishment as “.... infliction of something which 
is assumed to be unwelcome to the recipient:  the inconvenience of a disqualification, the hardship of 
incarceration, the suffering of a flogging, exclusion from the country or community, or in extreme cases 
death.”  at 1   https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/punishment punishment is defined as 
“Punishment definition: Punishment is the act of punishing someone or of being punished.” 
www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/punishment defines punishment as “an act or a way 
of punishing somebody”, Newman, G. 2008. The Punishment Response. 2nd ed. at 7-11 defines punishment as 
“1) Punishment must involve pain or unpleasant consequences.  2) Punishment must be a sanction for an 
offense against a specific rule or law.  3)  Punishment must be executed upon the specific offender who has 
allegedly or actually committed the crime.  4)  It must be administered intentionally by someone other than 
the offender.  5)  It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against 
which the offence is committed.” 
3 Flew, A.G.N at 291 and following  
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One might be tempted to interpret penalties as mere “pricetags” attached to a certain type 
of behaviour which are generally objectionable.4 
In the tax context, punishment and penalties impose deterrents for failures on the part of a 
taxpayer:  Penalties have a miscellaneous character, whereas punishment has an important 
additional characteristic as a mimetic consequence which is absent from other kinds of 
penalties. 
Certain actions and/or omissions are forbidden by law and are accordingly made offences.  
This is to announce to humanity that those actions are not allowed and certain remedies are 
to be taken if they are not adhered to, accordingly to act as a deterrent so that fewer offences 
occur.   
In punishment reference is made to “the wrong-person rule” and “the blameless-doer rule”.5  
Nobody is to be penalised for an offence which the wrongdoer has not committed, attempted 
or planned and these falls within the aforementioned rule.  In the latter rule, nobody is to be 
penalised for an offence which the wrongdoer has committed without mens rea.6 
In practice, it often happens that an act or omission by the Taxpayer can be justified; would 
it then be fair to penalise the Taxpayer in such an instance. 
1.2 Problem statement 
The previous penalty regime provided for in tax legislation has been largely replaced with a 
new comprehensive penalty regime now contained in the Admin Act.7  As one examines the 
different penalties that can be imposed it will become apparent that the purpose of the 
penalty regime is not in the pursuance of the doctrine of punishment.  It is accordingly in 
some instances ineffective as a method of punishment, in other words not in pursuance of 
the goals which the punishment doctrine would ordinarily seek to achieve, or merely 
incorrectly labelled. 
                                                          
4 Tonry, M. 2011. Why Punish? How Much? A reader on punishment. South Africa: Oxford University Press. at 
111 
5 Walker, N. 1991. Why Punish? South Africa: Oxford University Press. at 88 and following 
6 An offence committed without intention.  
7 Promulgated on 1 October 2012. 
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The commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) has the authority to remit 
penalties but this is only in certain circumstances and it has become evident that there are 
deficiencies in this regard which should be addressed.   There is a responsibility upon the 
Commissioner to conduct its business in a fair and just manner.      
There are various elements that the Commissioner for SARS considers in determining which 
penalty is to be imposed.  This dissertation will examine some of these elements and related 
questions, such as whether the “offence” committed has been intentional or as a result of 
negligence, what constitutes a first offence and a few more.8  
1.3 Research objective 
The two main objectives considered are: 
 Identifying the objects of the doctrine of punishment; and 
 Whether the above manifests in the Admin Act penalty provisions.   
To achieve the objectives of the study the following research questions will be answered:  
1. Whether the imposition of certain penalties is incoherent and inadequate for 
punishment in general? Accordingly, certain representations will be made.   
2. Who should be punished and how much punishment is necessary?  
3.  Whether the current penalty regime is truly an effective deterrent for wrongdoers 
and whether the penal system offers a just and practicable system for punishing 
offenders?   
4. Whether the Commissioner should have a discretion in the imposition and remission 
of certain penalties and accordingly to what degree?   
1.4 Research method 
This dissertation has a doctrinal investigative research approach to examine and determine 
what the philosophy of punishment is.  Historic research has been used to obtain a general 
understanding of the purpose of punishment and by examining the penalty provisions in an 
                                                          
8 Refer to Chapter 4. 
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income tax context to determine whether the main elements of punishment then coincides 
with the main purpose of the penalty regime. 
Furthermore, it obtains an understanding of the penalty provisions previously contained in 
the ITA and investigates the current penalty provisions in the Admin Act.  
The purpose of this approach involves the obtaining and understanding of the purpose of 
punishment and its alignment to the application of a penalty regime in an Income tax context.    
It is necessary to determine the objects of why someone is punished and how much 
punishment is necessary.  The penalty provisions are examined to determine the true 
purposes of the penalty regime and the efficacy thereof. 
The philosophy of punishment and the distributive principles of criminal law are examined 
from various law hand books.  The Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration 
Bill, 2011 is also examined to determine the primary purpose of the new provisions and its 
general application.  The efficacy of the penalty regime is examined and accordingly the 
dissertation attempts to determine whether the philosophy of punishment is achieved with 
the current tax penalty regime.   
1.5 Limitation of Scope 
The scope of this dissertation is the exploration and discussion of the purpose of punishment 
in general and it will be considered within the context of penalties levied by the Commissioner 
and whether the penalty regime operates in the pursuance of the doctrine of punishment.   
The different types of penalties and their application will be examined and what remittance 
possibilities are available to taxpayers and their efficiency.  This study will be limited to the 
relevant sections in the Admin Act only which sanctions the penalty regime.   
The elements of punishment that are applicable will be discussed in the Income Tax Act No 
58 of 1962 (“ITA”) context.  The remittance procedure will be discussed and whether the 
discretion to remit penalties should rest with the Commissioner of SARS, and whether that 
discretion is exercised within the philosophy of punishment.  
Proportionality of penalties are also very briefly considered.  
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The imposition of too harsh penalties and penalties incorrectly levied in practice can have 
constitutional consequences; however, these will not be discussed here.   
1.6 Structure of the dissertation  
The Dissertation will take on the following structure: 
1.6.1 Chapter 2:  The doctrine of punishment  
1.6.2 Chapter 3:  History of tax penalty provisions  
1.6.3 Chapter 4:  Different types of penalties and remission request 




CHAPTER 2:  The doctrine of punishment 
2.1 Meaning and purpose of punishment 
In 1.1 above it was pointed out that punishment is an act of hard treatment inflicted upon a 
person that does not adhere to preordained legal rules.  To exact punishment, one must 
evaluate whether the five elements9 that defines a standard case of punishment are 
present.10   
The five elements to define a standard case of punishment are:11 
 It must involve consequences normally considered unpleasant; 
 It must be for an offence that breached legal rules; 
 It must be for an actual offender for his offence; 
 It must be intentionally administered by human beings’ other than the offender; 
 It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system 
against which the offence is committed. 
“Nulla poena sine lege”12 is an accepted legal principle that sanctions that one cannot be 
punished for wrongdoings that are not prohibited by the law.  In relation to punishment the 
principle has at least two implications, one being that the penalties themselves need to be 
reasonably precisely defined and second that the imposition of such penalties should be 
governed by clear legal rules.  These legal rules must also meet the requirements of the 
principle of legality.13    
It is necessary to determine and understand what the main objects of punishment are to 
determine whether the application of the punishment achieves these objects.  The objectives 
                                                          
9 Flew, A.G.N. 1954. The Justification of Punishment. Philosophy. Vol. 29, No 111: at 291 and following. 
Available:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748210 [2017, March 6] 
10 1.1 above 
11 Flew, A.G.N. at 291 and following  
12 Grotius, H. 2012. The infliction of an ill suffered for an ill done. De Lure Belli ac Pacis, ch. Xx, De Poenis. Vol. 
ii: 240. Available:  https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nullum_crimen_sine_lege [2017, August 20]. 
13 van Zyl Smit, D. 1998. Sentencing and Punishment. Available:  
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/centre_publications/constitlaw/pdf/28-




of punishment will influence the nature of the punishment so that the appropriate sentence 
is imposed.14   
Punishment of offences is generally categorized into four justifications namely:     
“1) Retribution; 
  2) Deterrence; 
  3) Rehabilitation; 
  4)  Incapacitation (social protection)”15 
This dissertation will briefly examine these justifications so that one may consider how and 
why punishment is applied.       
In doing so, it becomes evident that punishment is necessary as both a preventative measure 
as well as a punitive measure as the incorrect application of punishment upon an offender for 
its wrongdoings could lead to an imbalance for society and cause more harm than anything 
else.  It could also lead to Constitutional16 issues, however as mentioned these are not 
discussed in this dissertation. 
Punishment is applied to assist and maintain a balance in society, accordingly punishment 
should benefit society.  Society should benefit to the extent that all can live in harmony.  We 
can measure this against the three theories referred to in the case of Ex Parte United States 
(242 U.S., 27, 38).  Reference is made to punishment, reformation and deterrence (or the 
effect upon the offender and the effect on others as a deterrent and on society as a 
justification of the law).   
It is obvious that punishment is applied with the purpose of punishing an offender, however 
an important aspect of punishment is the determination of the extent of the punishment.  I 
would question whether the extent of the punishment should be determined by the nature 
                                                          
14Du Toit, E. 1981. Straf in Suid-Afrika. South Africa: Juta & Company (Pty) Ltd. at 100  
15Marson, J. 2015. The History of Punishment. What works for State Crime? The Hilltop Review:  Vol. 7: Iss.2. 
Article 4. Available:  
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=hilltopreview at 19 and 
following, R v Swanepoel 1945 AD 444, S v Whitehead 1970 (4) SA 424 (A) 436E-F and S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 
855 (A) [2018, February 2] 
16 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, of 1996. 1996. 
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of the crime or the nature of the offender.  No two persons’ experience punishment in the 
same manner.  In my view humans are not all alike, therefore the appropriate punishment to 
be applied should not only be determined by the nature of the crime but also as to the nature 
of the offender.   
The term mens rea denotes the individual’s state of mind at the time of the offence.  This, as 
pointed out in Chapter 1, is another significant factor to consider.  In criminal law the offender 
will be held liable for its actions if the State can prove that the individual had the intent to act 
unlawfully.17  It is also possible for an individual to unintentionally commit an offence, where 
guilt is represented through negligence rather than intent.    
In examining the different categories of punishment, it becomes apparent that punishment 
should first and foremost benefit society.  Having said this, it is evident that the law does not 
only seek to punish the offender but also attempts to reform the offender and in the process, 
sets an example for the society of what won’t be tolerated, in other words act as deterrent. 
All humans are different, some humans are sensitive to physical pain and some are easily 
humiliated, whilst others are reactive to confinement, we can therefore draw inference from 
“What’s sauce for the goose may likewise prove sauce for the gander, but not necessarily for 
the crow.”18 
It is necessary for the state to protect the public from repeated unlawful manifestations, and 
in the process, to also send warnings out to potential wrongdoers in the attempt to pre-empt 
further offences from occurring.  In South Africa, the most important object of punishment is 
arguably deterrence.19  It was highlighted in R v. Swanepoel20 when reference was made to S 
v Khumalo21 that “Deterrence has been described as the "essential", "all important", 
"paramount" and "universally admitted" object of punishment.”  
                                                          
17 Laws. A General Guide to Criminal Laws. Available:  http://criminal.laws.com/criminal-law [2017, August 20]. 
18 Alexander, J.P. 1922. The philosophy of punishment. Journal of Offender Law and Criminology. Vol. 13. Issue 
2: at 241. Available:   
http://scholarlycommons.law.nothwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1852&context=jclc [2018, 
February 14] 
19 Judge Nicolas J A, S v Khumalo and Others 1984 (3) SA 327 (AD) 
20 Swanepoel’s case ibid at 455.  
21 Khumalo’s case ibid at 330 D – E. 
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There is no general legislation that prescribes the approach which the courts must adopt 
regarding sentencing,22 however the Constitution demands protection against the arbitrary 
exercise of the power of the courts.23  There are limitations in respect of sentencing:  a 
maximum imposing sentence and prescribed minimum.  In South Africa, courts are granted 
an exceptionally wide discretion when imposing sentences.  The Supreme Court of Appeal 
however has no general restrictions on its punishment jurisdiction and can impose any 
sentence which it regards as appropriate in terms of the general principles of punishment as 
long as the sentence does not include a form of punishment that is specifically restricted to a 
particular offence.24  The wide discretion of the courts to sentence can be problematic as the 
same set of facts and circumstances can be presented to two different judges and the 
outcome of the punishment enforced by the judges could differ.25  There are two institutions 
which control the exercise of the sentencing discretion, namely relevant legislation and 
control exercised by the courts of appeal.  A court of appeal will only amend a decision of the 
trial court if it appears that the trial court has exercised its discretion in an improper or 
unreasonable manner.26   
Currently the point of departure in the sentencing process is that of the well-known dictum 
in S v Zinn27 :  “What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and 
the interests of society.”  The triad has been criticized in that the role of victims of crimes are 
not emphasized.28  The triad has also been observed in somewhat different terms:  
Punishment must fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society, and be blended with 
                                                          
22 van Zyl Smit, D. ibid at 1.  
23 van Zyl Smit, D. ibid at 26.  
24 van Zyl Smit, D. ibid at 1 and following. 
25 Refer to Ashworth, A.J. 1989. Criminal justice and deserved sentences. Criminal Law Review, also S v Young 
1977 (1) SA 602 (A) SACC 189 – 191 and comment by Nairn, R.G when he criticizes current practices as follows: 
... “two learned judges gave careful consideration to the same issues, arising out of a set of agreed facts, but 
arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions.  It seems that the nature of our sentencing procedure makes this 
type of outcome virtually inevitable, because whereas the course of the trial is determined by clearly defined 
rules of law, the approach to sentence is left largely to chance.  What this means - as the present case 
demonstrates - is that the point of view of the individual sentencer will largely determine his approach to a 
given set of facts, and there will therefore be as many different approaches as there are different sentencers...  
This state of affairs is quite understandable, because judges are human beings:  each one is a unique product of 
a unique combination of social, physical, psychological and economic influences, so each will inevitably go his 
own way in the absence of clearly articulated guidelines; as a consequence, uniformity in sentencing remains 
unattainable.  The problem of uniformity has not yet been approached seriously and scientifically in our law, 
and until it is it will remain a murky and uncertain, albeit vital, problem” 
26 S v Pieters 1987 (3) SA 717 (A)  
27 Zinn’s case ibid at 540 G. 
28 Zinn’s case ibid at 540 and following. 
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a measure of mercy per the circumstances.29  This observation of the triad has been 
supported:30  Punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to the State and 
to the accused, and be blended with a measure of mercy.     
It becomes evident that much uncertainty and inconsistency is brought into the sentencing 
process in South Africa due to the failure by the legislature to provide a clear and 
unambiguous legislative framework for the exercise of the sentencing discretion.  More 
elements that contribute to this uncertainty and inconsistency are the failure by the courts to 
develop firm rules for the exercise of the sentencing discretion and failure by the courts and 
the legislature to give firm guidance as to which sentencing theories or aims carry the most 
weight. 
We can therefore see that proper guidance and rules in legislation should play a vital role in 
measuring and achieving the purpose of punishment.  
The various categories of punishment must act collectively as a guard against potential future 
offences, however it should not be the primary focus of the purpose of punishment. 
It is understandable that there is a tendency to measure punishment31 by the harm that has 
been done, quantifying the punishment to fit the crime.32  However, one must not lose sight 
of the fact that a wrongdoing remains a wrongdoing irrespective of its extent.     
This brings us to the next question of how much punishment is necessary and the answer to 
this question should be: to the degree of the offender’s responsibility.33    
The reason for the application of this approach is to determine the offender’s accountability.  
This also puts the state in the position to distinguish and measure the criminal cap of children 
and mentally challenged persons.   
                                                          
29 Khumalo’s case ibid at 698A. 
30 S v Sparks 1972 (3) SA 396 (A) at 410H.  
31 Joubert, J.J. 2017. Criminal Procedure Handbook. 12th ed. South Africa: JUTA and Company (Pty) Ltd. Quote 
of WS Gilbert “The punishment must fit the crime”, also refer to “Sentencing and Punishment” above, refers 
to the principle ‘the punishment must fit the crime’ at 5  
32Rabie’s case ibid; S v Mjware 1990 (1) SACR 388 (N) at 389; S v Baartman 1997 (1) SACR 304 (E) at 305; S v 
Twala 1979 (3) SA 864 (T)  
33 Alexander, J.P. ibid at 241.  
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Mentally challenged persons have a different level of accountability than other people, only 
to the extent of their inexperience’s and their incapacity.34 
If the effectiveness of punishment is found in its harshness, then such harshness must be 
increased until it results in the minimising of the offence.35 
In considering the death penalty, there are no statistics that prove that the crimes were more 
frequent in countries which did not have the death sentence36.  The death penalty may very 
well be an effective deterrent however it lacks the reformation element.   
When one considers the aims of punishment, the question as to “why” punishment is 
necessary becomes clear. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the aims of punishment individually and it then becomes 
evident that all the aims need to coincide with each other to have an effective punishment 
system.  
As previously mentioned the aims of punishment should not stand alone or be considered by 
itself as this could produce an unsound basis of punishment.  This was supported when it was 
stated that: “All of these methods possess germs of rational punishment, but the very 
complexity and inconsistency of their application suggest erroneous hypotheses.”37 
Judge Holmes JA stated in S v Rabie:38  “The main purpose of punishment is deterrent, 
preventative, reformative and retributive.” 
These four elements form the basic factors of which the punishment doctrine is made up of.  
The correct application of a “mixture” of these will ensure that punishment in each individual 
case will be effective and attain the sought-after goals. 
                                                          
34 Flew, A.G.N ibid at 291 and following. 
35 Flew, A.G.N ibid at 295 and following. 
36 Marson, J. ibid at 20 and following. 
37 Alexander, J.P. ibid at 239. 
38 Rabie’s case ibid at 855. 
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2.2 Categories of punishment 
2.2.1 Retribution 
Retribution is considered the oldest rationale/reason for punishment.39  Punishment is 
justified merely because it is deserved.  If an offender commits a crime, they deserve to be 
punished.  Retribution strives for justice rather than rehabilitation of the offender.  
Retribution can be viewed as “revenge” upon an offender by society for a moral wrongdoing 
by the offender. 
Bearing in mind the long history of punishment, the best way to describe it was as follows: 
“The only aspect of punishment that needs justification is its distribution.”40 
The Retributivist stated: “punishment restores an equilibrium that was upset by the crime”.41  
It is evident that retribution thinkers are focused on past offences.   Punishment should not 
be considered to be vengeful only, accordingly there are limits to punishment and certain 
ethics that need to be followed to prevent it. 
Accordingly, it can be said that if punishment is in proportion to the crime committed by the 
offender, then retribution is not relevant.  The courts acknowledge retribution as requiring 
that punishment bears some relation to the seriousness of the offence and the 
blameworthiness of the offender, and that in this regard the wrongdoer should receive no 
more and no less than what the wrongdoer justly deserves.  Punishment must be humane.42  
The retributive nature of punishment contains a deterrent effect, as offenders have certainty 
of the punishment.   
In the case of R v Swanepoel43 reference was made to Gordon Criminal Law of Scotland (1967) 
at 50 that stated: “The retributive theory finds the justification for punishment in a past act, a 
wrong which requires punishment or expiation …  The other theories, reformative, 
                                                          
39 Marson, J. ibid at 20 and following.  
40 Newman, G. ibid at 4 and at 192.  
41 Newman, G. ibid at 192 and following. 
42 S v Groenemeyer 1974 (2) SA 542 (K)  
43 Swanepoel’s case ibid at 455. 
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preventative and deterrent, all find their justification in the future, in the good that will be 
produced as a result of the punishment.” 
Therefore, in R v Karg44 it was not strange that JA Schreiner observed that whilst deterrence 
remains an important factor, the retributive aspect is committed to yielding ground to the 
aspect of prevention and correction.  He believed it would depend on the circumstances of 
what importance the component of retribution would be accorded in a sentence and that he 
would typically consider factors such as the seriousness of the offence and the disposition 
and attitude of the offender (particularly the attitude towards his victim).45 
2.2.2 Deterrence 
The definition of deterrence is “The action of discouraging an action or event through instilling 
doubt or fear of the consequences.”46 
The deterrence category or theory is considered to be a more modern approach to 
punishment.47  Punishment should have a preventative function and not only a retributive 
function.48  Deterrence is a means of protecting the society.   
Punishment can take many different forms: However, in my view the primary focus should be 
to deter individuals from committing future wrongdoings.  The courts have stated that 
deterrence should strongly be considered when deciding upon the appropriate punishment.49   
When we consider deterrence, we are focused on the prevention of future wrongdoings from 
taking place, accordingly if punishment does not prevent future wrongdoings then it will just 
add to the suffering of the society.50   
                                                          
44 R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A) at 236A 
45 Karg’s case ibid at 236 following. 
46 Definition of “deterrence” in English in Oxford Dictionary – 
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/deterrence) [2017, August 16] 
47 Van Zyl Smit, D. ibid at 26 and following. 






49 S v Du Toit 1979 (3) SA 846 (A) at 857 H – 858 A  
50 Du Toit’s case ibid at 858 and following. 
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In considering the objects of punishment51 it is said that the certainty of punishment is the 
real deterrent and not necessarily the extent of the punishment itself.  This opinion is however 
not shared by all.52   
There are two types of deterrence namely a general deterrence and a specific deterrence.53  
General deterrence, as the name states, is applied by the state to deter the public that have 
not committed any offences.  Its purpose is to make the public aware of the consequences of 
the wrongdoings and accordingly puts them off from doing wrong.54 
On the other hand, individual deterrence was designed to deter only the offender from 
committing further wrongdoings, for example, revoking of a driver’s license where the 
offender has been convicted for drunk driving. 
A powerful factor in deterrence is an offender’s age.  Research has shown that individuals are 
naturally more disinclined to offend from the age of 35.55  The aging of the offenders naturally 
decreases the likelihoods of committing a future crime.   
There have been many philosophers that propagated the deterrence theory.56  In terms of 
the deterrence theory, there are three important components namely, severity; certainty and 
celerity (in other words the swiftness of imposing punishment).57 
These philosophers believed that the more severe the punishment was, the less likely 
offenders are to commit wrongdoings.  In respect of the severity of the punishment one faces 
two issues namely:  The harsher the punishment in comparison to the crime may result in the 
                                                          
51 LAWSA. Available:  http://www.legallibraryservices.co.za/law-of-south-africa-lawsa/ [2017, March 13]. 
52 Alexander, J.P. ibid at 238. 
53 Beccaria, C. ibid. 
54 Previously, the death penalty was a good example of attempted general deterrence.  It was designed by the 
state and served to enlighten the public of the consequences of wrongdoings.  In this process, the publish 
could view the infliction of pain exercised upon the offender and accordingly the public would be wary from 
committing such wrongdoings. 
55 Sampson, R.J., John. L & Eggleston, E.P. 2006. On the Robustness and Validity of Groups. Journal of 
Quantative Criminology. Vol. 20(1): 37-42. Available: 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B%3AJOQC.0000016698.36239.91 [2018, February 14] 
56 Hobbes, T.  1889. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. United States of America: Oxford University 




20Politic&f=false [2018, February 15] 
57 Hobbes, T ibid.  
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punishment being perceived as being unjust and unfair.  If the punishment is not severe 
enough though it would not act as a deterrent. 
Research has demonstrated that increasing the severity of punishment does not necessarily 
have much effect on the wrongdoing, whilst on the other hand increasing the certainty of 
punishment does have a deterrent effect.58 
In relation to certainty, the punishment must be carried out as confirmation that such 
offences will not be tolerated or allowed.  It must be certain that the offender will be 
punished. 
It is believed that the swift application of punishment increases the effect of deterrence.  
Deterrence theorists believe that certain and swift punishment were the most effective 
elements in preventing crime.59  Criminologist are therefore focusing on the expansion of the 
deterrence theory and more specifically on the specific subcomponents thereof.60  
To put the above in a South African tax context we look at the facts of some court cases and 
their outcomes.  In CIR v Da Costa,61  the Respondent made use of a company to compile his 
books and prepare the necessary annual income tax returns.  The company shortened the 
process of the compilation of the revenue and in the process, this resulted in a reduction of 
the true revenue and thereby understatement of income.  The Respondent was unaware of 
this, and upon review of the calculations the Appellant issued additional assessments which 
accounted for the amounts that were not declared.  Furthermore, a penalty was imposed for 
the understatement of income.  The Respondent objected against the penalty. The 
Respondent had no intention to deceive or wilfully withhold any income.  It was accepted that 
the above circumstances constituted extenuating circumstances, however the Appellant 
submitted that the Respondent had to be penalised for the dishonesty of the company he 
used to calculate his revenue. 
                                                          
58 Wright, V. 2010. Deterrence in Offender Justice:  Evaluating Certainty vs Severity of Punishment. Washington. 
D.C. Available: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-
Justice.pdf [2017, March 13]      
59 WordPress:  2010. Deterrence Theory. At 236 and following. Available:  
https://marisluste.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/deterrence-theory.pdf [2017, March 12].  
60 Being certainty, severity and celerity. 
61 (Case no 14/1984) 1985 ZASCA 32, 1985 (2) ALL SA 335 (A)  
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In an extract from the judgment it was evident that the Respondent must still take the 
responsibility of his business affairs upon himself.  The court was focused on whether the 
penalty imposed was justifiable against the circumstances of the case. 62   
The court held that a lessor penalty was more fitting to the circumstances of the matter.  The 
court said “Such an amount, which cannot conceivably be regarded as trifling to the person of 
the taxpayer’s means, enjoying the life-style he does, will certainly bring home to him the 
lesson which the legislature sought to teach errant taxpayers by providing for a penalty in 
circumstances such as are present here.  A lesser penalty would not serve the legislature’s 
purpose.  On the other hand, one as heavy as that deemed proper by the 'penalty fixing 
committee' is out of all proportion to the wrong committed.  The punishment must fit the 
crime, in tax matters no less than elsewhere.”  Own emphasis added. 
Deterrence has also been acknowledged to find application in cases that involved negligence 
and carelessness.63 The court observed in Bredell that in a case of gross negligence the 
deterrent purpose of punishment must be emphasized. 
Where it is evident, in Hartmann, that the crime is not likely to be repeated the deterrence, 
theory must not be applied.64  In this case the doctor administered euthanasia to his aged 
father who suffered from an incurable disease and was accordingly sentenced to one year's 
imprisonment.    
Accordingly, we draw inference from the above case law, that the South African courts 
acknowledge the role of retribution and deterrence as important objectives in determining 
the appropriate sentencing. 
Accordingly, one should focus more on the deterrent and retributive penal measures imposed 
by the courts than rehabilitation and incapacitation.  There is no doubt that the 
communication of the threat of punishment is significant to its effectiveness. 
                                                          
62 Da Costa’s case ibid at 14. 
63 R v Bredell 1960 (3) SA 558 (A) 560  




It is necessary that reformation be applied to the needs of the individual. 
Reformation is to restore to a former good state, to be put into a new and improved 
condition.65 
Rehabilitation is specifically in respect of the offender and considers the offenders’ social past.  
It is to restore someone to their former state, reputation, possession and status.   
These factors/considerations are not present with the retribution and deterrence 
philosophies.   
Supporters66 of rehabilitation recommend that one considers the offender and not the 
offence itself. 
It is believed that rehabilitation has a deterrent effect, in so far as an offender that is 
rehabilitated will be less likely to commit future offences.   
The United States used the rehabilitative model only until the 1970’s because it was 
considered that the model did not achieve the objective of controlling or preventing crime.67 
2.2.4 Incapacitation 
An example of incapacitation is where an offender is confined and cannot commit additional 
wrongdoings, in other words incarceration as incapacitation. 
Incapacitation has a deterrent element to it, in that a potential offender before committing 
any wrongdoing can fear incarceration and accordingly refrain from committing any 
wrongdoings – in other words fear of incarceration as a deterrent.   
                                                          
65Definition of Reformation.  Available:  https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1766 [2018, 
February 15] 
66Priya, T. 2014. Reformative Theory of Punishment. Available:  
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/reformative-theory-of-punishment/ [2017, March 3]. 
67Garland, D. 2002. The Culture of Control:  Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press. Available:  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/pol.2002.25.2.109/full 




Research has found that incarceration may exacerbate reoffending.68  Data used inside and 
outside the U.S concluded that “…compared to non-custodial sanctions, incarceration has a 
null or madly criminogenic impact on future offender involvement.  We caution that this 
assessment is not sufficiently firm to guide policy, with the exception that is calls into question 
wild claims that imprisonment has strong specific deterrent effects.”69 
2.3 Conclusion 
As stated in 2.1 above punishment of offences is generally categorized into four justifications 
namely:     
“1) Retribution; 
  2) Deterrence; 
  3) Rehabilitation; 
  4)  Incapacitation (social protection)”70 
In short retribution is focused on passed offences whilst the other categories find their 
justification in the future.  In respect of retribution, the courts require that the punishment 
must fit the offence committed by the offender.   
Though the punishment inflicted upon the offender will to a certain extent prevent the 
offender from committing future wrongdoings, the courts found it not to be the most 
important factor in preventing future wrongdoings.  
The definition of deterrence clearly states that it is the action of discouraging an action or 
event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences.  It was found to be the more 
modern approach to punishment. 
                                                          
68 Nagin, D.S, Francis, T., Cullen & Johnson, C.L. 2009. Imprisonment and Reoffending, Crime and Justice:  A 
review of Research. Vol 38:  at 115-200 Available:  
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/599202 [2018, February 15] 
69Nagin, D.S, Francis, T., Cullen & Johnson, C.L. ibid at 115 and following.  




Deterrence contains a preventative function and is used as a means of protecting the society.  
Deterrence is a way of preventing future wrongdoings.  It was found that if the punishment is 
not severe enough it would not act as a deterrent. 
It was evident from case law that the South African courts acknowledged the role of 
deterrence as a very important objective in the determination of the appropriate sentencing. 
Reformation is applied specifically in relation to the needs of the individual.  It is focused on 
restoring the former good state and to improve it and does not have much effect on 
preventing the wrongdoing from reoccurring.     
Having considered these categories, it becomes clear that the dominant element for 
consideration, is deterrence.    Ultimately, a penal system should be of such nature that 















CHAPTER 3:   History of tax penalty provisions 
In Chapter 2 above I examined the history of punishment and established what the objects of 
punishment are.  I examined the different categories of punishment namely: retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation. 
The identified categories all play a role in ensuring that the right ‘outcome’ is achieved.  
Punishment is therefore focused on the past and the future.  Whilst retribution is focused on 
the past, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation is focused on the future.  
This is to ensure that wrongdoers are held accountable for what they did wrong and to 
prevent them from committing future wrongdoings.  It was evident In Chapter 2 that the 
courts of South Africa favoured and focused on the role of deterrence.   
In a tax context, it is important that a penal system should act as a deterrent to prevent any 
wrongful activities and accordingly for a penalty levying system to truly operate as an effective 
penal system there must be a suitable framework and it must align with the doctrine of 
punishment. 
In a tax context punishment usually takes the form of a penalty that is imposed, however 
depending on the default in question it could be as drastic as imprisonment.  
It has been explained by the courts71 that penalties are collected by SARS, however it is 
ultimately the penal statutory provisions that carry a penalty.  
As pointed out in Chapter 2, it is necessary to obtain the correct equilibrium for punishment. 
It also cannot be said that the imposition of high penalties would automatically reduce 
noncompliance, as such high penalties may result in taxpayers not being able to afford such 
penalties and could lead to a general feeling of unfairness. 
This chapter provides an overview of the historic penal provisions and the new penalty regime 
currently operative in the Admin Act.  In the next chapter the new penalty regime will be 
examined to determine whether the current penal provisions truly achieve its objectives and 
whether it accords with the objects of punishment. 
                                                          
71Israelsohn v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1952 (3) SA 529 (A), ITC  1295 ibid, ITC 1351 1981 44 SATC 58   
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In ITC 1576,72 it was held that the penalty should not be too harsh and effect the taxpayer to 
such an extent that it cannot continue to be an effective member of society. 
The term ‘tax’ is defined in the Tax Administration Act, No 28 of 2011 ‘Admin Act’ as:  
“for purposes of administration under this Act, includes a tax, duty, levy, royalty, fee, 
contribution, penalty, interest and any other moneys imposed under a tax Act;” own 
emphasis added. 
It is therefore clear from the TAA that the definition of tax includes a penalty. 
3.1 Purpose of tax penalties 
It appears that there are different motivations for the imposition of tax penalties and that 
different countries impose penalties for different purposes.73 These purposes include:  
punitive, as deterrence and a compensation purpose.74 
It was evident in some countries that one of the purposes of penalties can very well be of a 
compensatory nature.75   
In another country76 the tax authorities are empowered with the discretion to impose 
penalties at their discretion without any specific guidance.  This was said to be an effective 
system for the imposition of the penalties as the burden to prove the opposite rests with the 
taxpayer and it is difficult to convince the tax authorities otherwise.77  It can however be said 
that the effectiveness of the penal system depends on the effectiveness of the tax system and 
the tax administration. 
                                                          
72 56 SATC 225 at 232 
73 Wilms, L. and Seer, R. Eds. 2016. Surcharges and Penalties in Tax Law. Vol 14. Netherlands: European 
Association of Tax Law Professors and authors. At 35 
74 Austria and Greece do not impose penalties with the consideration of punishment as purpose, they focus on 
the deterrence purpose; Wilms, L. and Seer, R. ibid at page 35 and following. 
75 It was previously perceived that Greece (prior to 2014) imposed penalties with the motive of collecting 
revenue especially in instances where the revenue authorities incorrectly imposed such penalties:  Wilms, L. 
and Seer, R. ibid at page 35 and following. 
76 Switzerland, Wilms, L. and Seer, R. ibid at page 35 and following. 
77 Wilms, L. and Seer, R. ibid at page 42 
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When observing different countries, it is evident that the purpose of the imposition of 
penalties differs from country to country78.  The effectiveness of a penal system also very 
much depends on the economic situation of a specific country. 
Another purpose of the imposition of penalties was to re-establish any economic imbalance 
that existed prior to the relevant violations. 79 
Therefore, the purpose of penalties can be either that of a preventative nature or that of a 
punitive nature.  Per the objectives of the penalty regime in South Africa it is evident that the 
main purpose should not be that of raising revenue but instead to promote effective tax 
compliance.80   
The Tax Court81 explained previously that the purpose of the penalty provisions of the ITA and 
the application of the imposition of a penalty is intended to act as a deterrent to taxpayers 
and potential wrongdoers.  The focus of the penalty regime was to ensure that taxpayers 
submit their income tax returns in an accurate and honest manner in other words to deter 
from default.  This would ultimately improve the revenue compliance and collection. 
Accordingly, imposing penalties is necessary to promote and improve tax compliance.  While 
penalties may be an effective manner to increase tax compliance it most certainly should not 
take “a one size fits all” approach.  The incorrect application of the penalty regime could lead 
to an imbalance and possibly have Constitutional consequences.  These will however not be 
discussed in this dissertation. 
Judge Nicolas J A82 is of the opinion that the most important and universally admitted object 
of punishment is deterrence.  
In ITC 143083 the court held that in the process of deciding the extent of the penalty that 
needs to be imposed there are ultimately three main factors to consider; punishment of the 
taxpayer; the deterrent effect on the taxpayer himself; and the deterrent effect on others.  
                                                          
78 Wilms, L. and Seer, R. ibid at page 32 and following 
79 This was evident in Italy:  Wilms, L. and Seer, R. ibid at page 32 and following  
80 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill. 2011 
81 CIR v Ciccio 1985 (3) SA 989 (T), ITC 1351 1981 44 SATC 58 
82 Khumalo’s case ibid at 330D-E 
83 50 SATC 51 at 54 
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The court considered what effect the imposition of a penalty can have on a taxpayer.84  In this 
case the taxpayer was illiterate and worked long hours without taking any breaks.  The court’s 
view on this was that a penalty should not be automatically imposed by SARS.  The facts and 
circumstances of each case should be considered to determine whether extenuating 
circumstances exist that warrant the levying of a lessor penalty.  The court stated that the 
imposition of an excessive penalty could negatively impact the taxpayer’s labours and efforts.  
Ultimately considering all the facts, the court found that a 50% penalty was justified instead 
of the 100% originally imposed.  It was also held that the purpose of the imposition of a 
penalty, was to make up for the ‘loss of interest, which would have been paid if there had been 
a proper and timeous assessment, by virtue of the delayed payment of tax’.85   
To determine the purpose of tax penalties in South Africa and the effectiveness thereof it is 
necessary to review the application of the penalty regime historically.  
This chapter provides an overview of the penalty regime both prior to the enactment of the 
Admin Act and the regime currently operative.  This chapter also provides an overview of 
concerns around the imposition and the remission of penalties. 
3.2 Section 75B of the ITA 
Previously, by failing to submit income tax returns, a taxpayer contravened section 75(1)(a) 
of the ITA and accordingly was guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 24 months.   
In terms of section 76 the Commissioner was entitled to levy additional tax in the event of 
default or omission as relates to the completion or submission of a person’s annual income 
tax return.    
Taxpayers were charged a fine for admission of guilt and the imposition of additional tax for 
the non-submission of the annual income tax returns.  This caused much discontent as 
taxpayers believed it was not constitutional to pay a fine and be charged with additional tax 
for the same offence.86  
                                                          
84 ITC 1331 1980 43 SATC 76  
85ITC 1331 case ibid at 87 
86 ITC 11641 ZATC (2006) 
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In S v Odendaal87 clarity was provided that administrative penalties do not constitute criminal 
penalties.  It was further evident that the main purpose of an administrative penalty was not 
to punish the wrongdoer, instead it was to maintain the effectiveness of the tax system.  
It was questionable whether penalties for non-compliance were inconsistently imposed for 
different taxpayers and that the different SARS branch offices dealt with similar taxpayers in 
a different manner and seemingly arbitrarily.88   
In 2.2.2 above it was pointed out that the certainty of punishment is the real deterrent and 
not necessarily the extent of the punishment itself, however it was also pointed out that there 
are two different types of deterrence namely general deterrence and specific deterrence.   
If the Commissioner is to conduct its matters in a fair and equitable manner, it would appear 
that specific deterrence rather than general deterrence be applied in a tax context.   
The provisions were subsequently repealed and replaced with Section 75B of the ITA which 
took effect from 1 January 2009.89 In terms of section 75B the Commissioner could impose 
administrative penalties in respect of non-compliance as prescribed. The Commissioner had 
to ensure that the administrative penalties for non-compliance were imposed impartially, 
consistently and proportionately to the seriousness of the non-compliance.   
Section 75B only dealt with the administrative penalties imposed under the ITA and did not 
change or affect the penalties imposed for value-added tax, securities transfer tax, transfer 
duty, skills development and other taxes administered by the Commissioner.  
Section 75B(3) empowered the Minister to make regulations prescribing the administrative 
penalties that the Commissioner may have imposed and the procedures that needed to be 
followed by the Commissioner when imposing such administrative penalties.  Furthermore, it 
set out what procedures a taxpayer had to follow when an administrative penalty was 
imposed in order to obtain any relief thereof.  Also, identifying in which circumstances the 
                                                          
87 1995 (2) SACR 449 (T)  
88 Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs. 2009. Administrative Penalties. Integritax SAICA Newsletter 1739 Issue 118. 
Available:   www.saica.co.za/integritax/2009/1739_Aministrative _penalties.htm [2017, January 4]. 
 
89 Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs. 2009. Administrative Penalties. Integritax SAICA Newsletter 1739 Issue 118. 
Available:   www.saica.co.za/integritax/2009/1739_Aministrative _penalties.htm [2017, January 4]. 
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Commissioner could remit any administrative penalty imposed.  The Commissioner had an 
obligation to remit the administrative penalties in certain circumstances.90  
In practice there were many discussions relating to the imposition of penalties under section 
75B(3) that has made it clear that the main object of these penalties was not to punish or 
deter the wrongdoer, instead it was rather to ensure the maintaining of the effectiveness of 
the tax system.   
3.3 Section 76 of the ITA 
In terms of section 76 of the ITA if a taxpayer in respect of any year of assessment defaulted 
in rendering a return and omitted from its return any amount which ought to have been 
included therein or made an incorrect statement therein which resulted in the assessment of 
normal tax at an amount which was less than the tax properly chargeable, then the taxpayer 
was required to pay in addition to the tax chargeable an amount equal to twice the difference 
between the tax amount calculated in respect of the taxable income returned by the taxpayer, 
and the tax properly chargeable in respect of the taxpayer’s taxable income as determined 
after the inclusion of the omitted amount.  The taxpayer could be liable for additional tax up 
to 200% in certain instances.  
In ITC 148991 it is evident that the reasoning behind the imposition of additional tax was not 
only to ensure the accuracy on income tax returns, but also to avoid loss to the fiscus.   
The Commissioner must, if a penalty was imposed, give a notice of the assessment in the 
desired format to the relevant person and it must include: 
 The non-compliance in respect of which the penalty is assessed and its duration; 
 The amount of the penalty assessed; 
 The due date for paying the penalty; 
 The automatic increase of the penalty; and  
                                                          
90National Gazette 31764, 31 December 2008. Vol 522: para 11. Available:  
https://www.greengazette.co.za/pages/national-gazette-31764-of-31-dec-2008-vol-522_20081231-GGN-
31764-015.pdf [2017 August 16] 




 A summary of procedures for requesting remittance of, or objecting to, the penalty. 
A penalty was due upon assessment and had to be paid on or before the due date stated in 
the notice of the penalty assessment. 
Upon receipt of the penalty assessment the taxpayer could, on or before the due date for 
payment, in the relevant prescribed format request that the Commissioner, remit the penalty 
in accordance with the various provisions of the regulations.  In certain instances, the 
Commissioner could have extended the period.  The prescribed remittance request had to 
contain the relevant circumstances which prevented the taxpayer from complying with the 
relevant obligations under the Act in respect of which the penalty had been imposed and had 
to contain any relevant supporting documentation and information as required by the 
Commissioner. 
The Commissioner could remit a penalty or a portion thereof if it was satisfied that one or 
more specified circumstances existed.  If extenuating circumstances were present, the 
Commissioner could, on a discretionary basis, have remitted or reduced the penalty.  There 
was no exhaustive list in terms of what constituted extenuating circumstances. 
In instances where the Commissioner was satisfied that the penalty was incorrectly assessed 
it could, within a limitation of three years of the penalty assessment, have issued an altered 
assessment to the taxpayer.  The decision not to remit the penalty in part or in whole was 
subject to an objection and appeal.   
It must however be borne in mind that in terms of section 82 of the ITA, the onus of proof 
rested on the taxpayer: once SARS alleges that an amount is so owing, the taxpayer must 
prove otherwise.  Section 82 of the ITA has however been replaced with section 102 of the 
Admin Act. 
Where the taxpayer has requested to be provided with reasons for the imposition of the 
penalty, the reasons provided by the Commissioner must be sufficient to place the taxpayer 
in a position to determine whether it is fitting to proceed with an objection and an appeal 
against the imposition of the additional tax. 
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The main concern with legislation was the fact that no guidelines existed that defined the 
Commissioner’s powers or any indication of possible factors that could influence his decision-
making.   
The wording of section 76 of the ITA empowered the Commissioner to impose a 200 per cent 
penalty in cases of an ‘understatement’92.  Since there was no guidance or rules to regulate 
the imposition of additional taxes, the Commissioner in some cases provided inadequate or 
even no reasons at all when penalties were levied93.   
Considering that section 76 imposed a 200% penalty it was argued that the aim of the penalty 
was to punish the taxpayer rather than merely just ensuring that the taxpayer complies with 
the provisions of the ITA.  In 2.2.1 above it was pointed out that the courts acknowledged 
retribution as requiring that the punishment bears some relation to the seriousness of the 
offence and that the wrongdoer should receive what it deserved – no more or no less.  The 
punishment must be humane.   
In ITC 129594 the Court was of the opinion that the Commissioner was in a far better position 
to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed and that the court would only intervene 
in circumstances where the Commissioner has acted unreasonably.  Typically, this would have 
been in instances where there was a significant difference between the penalty imposed by 
the Commissioner and that which the Court deemed appropriate to be imposed.   
It is therefore evident that the application of the penalty provision imposing the highest 
penalty percentage were in some instances not aligned with the doctrine of punishment.   
3.4 Remittance of the penalties 
Section 76(2)(a) of the ITA previously provided the Commissioner with the power to remit 
additional tax or any part thereof as he may have considered appropriate.   
In instances where there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to avoid tax and no 
extenuating circumstances were present for the tax position taken by the taxpayer, the 
                                                          
92 As defined in the Admin Act 
93 Qwa-Qwa Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 2005 ZAGPHC 121 
94 1983 42 SATC 19 at 30-31 
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Commissioner was not allowed to remit the additional tax levied by him.95  This provision was 
aligned with the objectives of punishment as it provided certainty and the wrongdoer was 
punished for the wrong done.   
In considering whether to remit the additional tax levied the intent of the taxpayer was to be 
tested.96  This test was a subjective test and the test was that one needed to establish what 
the intention of the taxpayer was at that specific point in time. For the Commissioner to have 
concluded that intent on the part of the taxpayer was present, the Commissioner had to have 
concluded that certain circumstances were present at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.  
Where a taxpayer was knowingly aware and expected the consequent damages that followed, 
the criteria for intent would have been met.97 
For the Commissioner to have arrived at a fair and equitable penalty to be levied, he needed 
to have considered the circumstances of the specific case at hand.  It was questionable 
whether the Commissioner could objectively and fairly interpret a penalty in the absence of 
any set of rules or some judicial guidance.   
In a landmark case98 SARS insisted on the imposition of a 200 per cent penalty as the 
Commissioner believed no extenuating circumstances were present that warranted a 
different penalty payable.  Ultimately, upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal the Court 
reduced the penalty from 200 per cent to a 100 per cent as they found that the percentage 
was too severe and out of proportion relating to the wrong that was committed by the 
taxpayer. 
Accordingly, it was questionable whether certain factors such as personal circumstances, age, 
first time offender, number of dependents or ignorance of the law could be considered to 
justify the imposition of a lessor amount of penalty.   
The Commissioner had to decide what was fair and equitable in each case without guidance 
from any provision on the factors to be considered or the circumstances of each taxpayer.  
The court provided some guidance in ITC 175899 in respect of the factors that a court would 
                                                          
95 S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A)  
96 Sigwahla’s case ibid.  
97 Sigwahla’s case ibid. 
98 CSARS v NWK 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA)  
99 2013 65 SATC 396 
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consider in respect of the penalty imposed. In this case the taxpayer initially denied that the 
amount received was not taxable.  A settlement was reached between the Commissioner and 
the taxpayer on this point, however no settlement was reached in respect of the discretion 
exercised by SARS to impose a 100% penalty.   The taxpayer, aggrieved by the imposition of a 
100% penalty, proceeded with an objection against the penalty on the basis that his personal 
circumstances (his circumstances being:  65 years of age and having fled to SA from Angola 
during the war) justified a lesser penalty.  The Commissioner contended that the main 
purpose of imposing penalties was to deter taxpayers from evading tax.  Having considered 
all the facts and circumstances the Court imposed a 50% penalty. 
In ITC 1508100 the court held that the lack of knowledge on the part of a taxpayer resulted in 
a bona fide failure to submit certain amounts and it was found to be a sufficient defence 
against the imposition of a penalty.  
Due to the lack of guidance in the ITA, taxpayers had to rely on court cases to support their 
contentions to have penalties remitted or reduced.  This lack of guidance caused much 
uncertainty.  
It is therefore clear that the Commissioner could not claim to have exercised its decision on a 
fair and equitable basis if it has no set of rules or at least some judicial guidelines against 
which to apply the imposition of penalties.  It is therefore questionable whether certain rules 
and guidelines should exist for a decision of the Commissioner to be reasonable. 
In ITC 1576101 it was questioned whether legislation should not provide a taxpayer with the 
right to represent itself before the imposition of a penalty.  This is referred to as the audi 
alterem paltem rule.  This could very well eliminate unnecessary lengthy litigation processes, 
given the fact that some taxpayers cannot afford litigation and because of this must merely 
accept what has been imposed.  If this rule had to be applied it would establish a more fair 
and effective process.  The Commissioner might defend such position and state that the 
workload of SARS would increase tremendously.  However, the counter argument is that if 
the facts and circumstances of the taxpayer’s case is thoroughly examined before the 
                                                          
100 1991 53 SATC 442 
101 1992 56 SATC 225 at 235 
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imposition of a penalty and the penalty truly reflects the offence committed, then it will only 
be necessary to litigate on penalties in exceptional circumstances.  
It is evident that a more guided penalty regime in respect of the imposition of penalties was 
needed for the outcome to be more fair and equitable to both the Commissioner and 
taxpayers.   
3.5 Penalty regime contained in the Admin Act 
The Admin Act became operative on 1 October 2012 and although the administrative penalty 
provisions are very similar to the penalty provisions that were previously introduced into the 
ITA in 2009, they are now overridden.  
Sections 208 to Sections 220 of the Admin Act deal with administrative non-compliance 
penalties.  These will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
The provisions dealing with penalties for different types of non-compliance are grouped into 
three main categories and are dependent upon different circumstances and ultimately the 
degree of severity of the transgressions. 
In terms of the Admin Act the Commissioner can impose two types of penalties, namely, the 
"fixed amount penalty" and the "percentage-based penalty". 
A fixed amount penalty is imposed in terms of section 211 of the Admin Act and is in respect 
of failure to comply with an obligation that is imposed by or under a tax Act and is listed in a 
public notice.102 
A percentage-based penalty is imposed in terms of section 213 of the Admin Act and is 
imposed in respect of an amount of tax that was not paid as and when required to under a 
tax Act. 
The ultimate significance of the Public Notice governing the imposition of administrative 
noncompliance penalties was to ensure that taxpayers are treated in the same manner for 
the same nature of offences, ultimately ensuring a fair, equitable and comparative platform 
for all.   
                                                          
102 Section 210(2)(a) – (c) of the Admin Act  
31 
 
It is still a difficult task, as the details and circumstances of each matter is not publicised, it is 
difficult to ensure that all taxpayers that have similar facts and circumstances are dealt with 
in the same manner.   
It was pointed out in 2.1 above that the four categories of punishment form the basic factors 
of which the punishment doctrine is made up of and that the correct application of a 
“mixture” of those will ensure that punishment in each individual case will be effective and 
attain the ultimate objective of punishment.  Punishment requires certainty as it contains a 
deterrence element.  
Taxpayers have nevertheless welcomed the new penalty regime as it appears to be a solution 
to a great part of the controversy.103  
3.6 The Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill, 2011  
Per the Explanatory Memorandum104 the purpose of the Tax Administration Bill was to align 
and modernize the outdated framework in the ITA with the current modern business world 
today.105  One of the most significant objectives is largely to reduce the cost and the burden 
of tax administration for taxpayers in general.  Furthermore, it strives to achieve a balance 
between the powers and duties of the Commissioner and the rights and obligations of 
taxpayers.  It further seeks to establish a transparent relationship between the Commissioner 
and taxpayers.  For administrative justice to be attained, it is necessary to ensure consistent 
treatment among taxpayers in comparable circumstances.  
The Admin Act endeavours to effect protection of administrative fairness and taxpayers’ 
rights through affording taxpayers more effective remedies and specific procedural rights. 
When the Admin Act was drafted, the following principles of international best practices in 
tax administration were focused on106: 
                                                          
103 Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr. 2011. Understatement penalty. Integritax SAICA Newsletter 2013 Issue 147. 
Available:  https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2011/2013._Understatement_penalty.htm [2017, August 
14] 
104 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill. 2011  
105 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill. 2011 para 2  
106 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill. 2011  
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(a) Equity and fairness to ensure that the tax system is fair and perceived to be fair, which 
should in turn enhance compliance. 
(b) Certainty and simplicity so that tax administration is not seen as arbitrary but 
transparent, clear and as simple as the complexity of the system allows. 
(c) Efficiency, where compliance and administration costs are kept to a minimum and 
payment of tax is as easy as possible. 
(d) Effectiveness, so that the right amount of tax is collected, active or passive non-
compliance is kept to a minimum, and the system remains flexible and dynamic to 
keep pace with technological and commercial development. 
In 2.1 above it was evident that punishment is applied to assist and maintain a balance in 
society and accordingly it should benefit the society.  Furthermore, the state has a 
responsibility to prevent repeated unlawful manifestations from occurring and accordingly 
they must make it known that they would not tolerate such actions, in other words it should 
act as deterrent.  
It was also pointed out that the punishment should fit the wrongdoer as well as the 
wrongdoing, it must be fair to the state and to the wrongdoer.  Therefore, the four elements 
(retribution, deterrence, reformation/rehabilitation and incapacitation) that forms the basis 
of the punishment doctrine plays an important role and should be correctly applied to achieve 
the right equilibrium and result.  
If no clear legislative framework exists, there will be uncertainty and inconsistency.  
Accordingly, it was evident that proper guidance and rules in legislation plays a vital role in 
the measuring and achieving of the objects of the purpose of punishment. 
The proposed penal provisions indicated that it was focused on equity, fairness, certainty, 
simplicity, efficiency and effectiveness which aligns with the objectives of punishment. 
3.7 Conclusion 
There was, prior to the enactment of the Admin Act, no specific guidance in respect of the 
imposition of penalties and it could therefore be said that the implementation of the 
behaviour table in the Admin Act was a step in the right direction.  
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In terms of the Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Tax Administration Bill107 it was 
indicated that the open-ended discretion to impose additional taxes up to 200% in terms of 
section 76 was inappropriate as it conferred a too wide discretion of SARS officials.  This wide 
discretion could lead to unconstitutionality as it could cause an imbalance of the right to 
equality and the right to administrative justice of taxpayers.  
It is not clear to what extent requests for remittance of penalties are considered and what 
factors and circumstances are considered to quantify the decision to remit a penalty.    
The absence of proper guidance in the Admin Act therefore creates certain reservations as to 
whether the penalty regime and relevant discretion of the Commissioner to remit or not to 
remit penalties truly operates in the pursuance of the doctrine of punishment.  
In Chapter 4 I address the specific areas of concern in respect of the amended penalty regime. 
A penalty regime can only be proficient and act as a respectable deterrent if there is certainty, 
as it would be clear what the exact consequences of certain actions are.  Where there are any 







                                                          
107 National Treasury, 2019:17 Available: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/annual%20reports/national%20treasury/nt%20annual%20report
%202009-10.pdf [2018, February 15] 
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CHAPTER 4:  Different types of penalties and remission request 
4.1 Administrative non-compliance penalties (Chapter 15)  
4.1.1 Introduction 
The administrative non-compliance penalties are imposed in terms of Section 210 of the 
Admin Act when a taxpayer fails to comply with the administrative requirements of the tax 
Acts and are referred to as administrative non-compliance penalties. 
Section 210 states:   
“(1) If SARS is satisfied that non-compliance by a person referred to in subsection (2) 
exists, SARS must impose the appropriate ‘penalty’ in accordance with the Table in 
section 211. 
(2) Non-compliance is failure to comply with an obligation that is imposed by or under 
a tax Act and is listed in a public notice issued by the Commissioner, other than- 
 (a) the failure to pay tax subject to a percentage-based penalty under Part C;  
(b) non-compliance in respect of which an understatement penalty under Chapter 16 
has been imposed; or  
(c) the failure to disclose information subject to a reportable arrangement penalty 
under section 212.” 
4.1.2 Fixed amount administrative non-compliance penalties 
Section 211(1) of the Admin Act contains a table with the fixed amounts that are to be 
imposed when a taxpayer commits any of the non-compliances listed by the Commissioner in 
a public notice.  The reason for this is only to target serious non-compliance. It was decided 
that the new penalty provisions would be phased in gradually, accordingly only a public notice 
was issued,108 in terms of which natural persons are only penalised if they have two or more 
outstanding income tax returns on or after 1 March 2006. 
                                                          
108 National Gazette 35733. 1 October 2012. Vol. 568. Available:  
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/SecLegis/LAPD-LSec-TAdm-PN-2012-01%20-
%20Notice%20787%20GG%2035733%201%20October%202012.pdf [2018, February 15] 
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The penalty to be imposed ranges from R250 to R16 000 per month.  It is imposed based on 
the tax liability of the preceding year of assessment. Where the previous year of assessment 
had an assessed loss or a taxable income that does not exceed R250 000, the penalty imposed 
is R250.  The penalty increases to a maximum of R16 000 where the preceding year of 
assessment’s taxable income exceeds R50 million.   
The penalty is levied monthly until the non-compliance is remedied, in other words the 
overdue return(s) are submitted.  The imposition of the penalties does however not run 
limitless, a limit of 35 months has been attached to the imposition of this penalty.  
A further deterrent has been included being that if SARS is not in possession of the 
wrongdoers address the period of the penalty imposed can be extended to a maximum of 47 
months.  This accords well with the endeavour to achieve good tax administration and is a 
way that assists to ensure that taxpayers keep SARS informed of their whereabouts.  
However, on the other hand it could also be argued that taxpayers should be punished for 
not keeping their information up to date irrespective of whether their returns are rendered 
up to date. 
Furthermore, the Commissioner is entitled to levy interest on the outstanding penalty 
monthly. 
Also, taxpayers may face a double penalty in instances where they have failed to submit their 
tax returns and have an income tax liability in respect of those years of assessment.  This is 
where the percentage-based penalties come into play.  If a taxpayer is a provisional taxpayer 
and the amount due is paid late, the taxpayer will be charged an additional penalty in respect 
of the late payment. 
4.1.3 Minimum penalties 
Minimum penalties are available to taxpayers in certain instances such as: 
 Companies listed on a recognized stock exchange;  
 Companies whose gross receipts and accruals for the preceding year of assessment 
exceeded R500 million; 
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 Members of any group of companies that includes a company in either of the above 
two categories; and  
 A person or an entity that are exempt from income tax (but is liable to tax under 
another tax act) with receipts and accruals that exceed R30 million.109 
4.1.4 Reportable Arrangement Penalty 
Reportable arrangements are defined in the Admin Act110.  In short there are two types of 
reportable arrangements (RA’s) namely: 
 Arrangements in which specific identified requirements are present111; and   
 The second category is reportable arrangements which are identified by the Minister 
by notice in the Gazette.  These arrangements are identified based on certain 
characteristics which have the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for or reducing 
the amount of taxes on income.112 
A fixed amount penalty is imposed on a participant to a reportable arrangement who neglects 
to provide information in respect of the reportable arrangement. 
Depending on the amount of the anticipated tax benefit, the penalty for the ‘participant’ is 
R50 000 and in the case of the ‘promotor’ it is R100 000, imposed monthly for up to 12 
months. 
The penalty can be doubled if the projected tax benefit for the participant exceeds R5million 
and can be as much as three times the initial penalty amount if the tax benefit exceeds R10 
million. 
Where a reportable arrangement penalty has been imposed by SARS and the taxpayer is 
aggrieved by the penalty imposed the taxpayer may request for remittance of the penalty in 
terms of section 217 of the Admin Act. 
Section 217 allows for the remittance of a penalty as related to the ‘first incidence’ of non-
compliance.  This is potentially a grey area for taxpayers as the wording of section 217 is too 
                                                          
109 Section 211(3)(d) of the Admin Act 
110 Section 35(1) of the Admin Act  
111 Section 35(1)(a) to (e) of the Admin Act 
112 Section 35(2) of the Admin Act 
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vague in respect of RA’s.  There is uncertainty in respect of whether the ‘first incidence’ refers 
to the first ever failure on the part of the taxpayer to disclose any reportable arrangement or 
if it refers to the first month of failure by a relevant participant to disclose the particular 
reportable arrangement. 
A taxpayer who is aggrieved by the penalty may alternatively, if exceptional circumstances as 
listed in section 218(2) exist request for remittance.  The taxpayer may request for remission 
irrespective of whether the non-compliance is a ‘first incidence’ of non-compliance or not.        
There is uncertainty as to the extent of SARS’ powers in respect of remission of a penalty for 
non-compliance under section 218.  The main uncertainty is whether SARS may remit the 
whole amount of the penalty imposed if the relevant criteria as set out has been met or are 
satisfied. 
Only if the whole amount is remitted can it be said that the result is fair and equitable to 
taxpayers.  It can also only then truly reflect that the purpose of punishment is to only punish 
deliberate wrongdoers and not the taxpayer who goes about their tax affairs in a true, honest 
fashion.  
4.1.5 Percentage based penalties  
Section 213(1) of the Admin Act states- 
“If SARS is satisfied that an amount of tax was not paid as and when required under a 
tax Act, SARS must, in addition to any other ‘penalty’ or interest for which a person 
may be liable, impose a ‘penalty’ equal to the percentage of the amount of unpaid tax 
as prescribed in the tax Act.” 
Accordingly, Section 213 provides for a penalty to be imposed under the Admin Act if SARS is 
satisfied that an amount of tax was not paid as and when it was required to be paid under a 
tax Act. 
The Admin Act does not specify the actual percentages that are to be imposed.  The penalty 
to be imposed is equal to a percentage of the amount of tax which is unpaid, as prescribed 
under the relevant tax Acts.  
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The circumstances which warrant the imposition of the percentage-based penalty are 
regulated by the relevant tax Acts.  The Admin Act deals specifically with the procedures of 
imposition and the requests for remittance of such penalties. 
4.1.6 Percentage based penalties applied:  provisional tax, PAYE, VAT  
Provisional tax: 
Penalties relating to provisional tax are determined by the Fourth Schedule to the ITA.  They 
are as follows: 
 In terms of paragraph 27(1) a 10% late payment or non-payment of provisional tax 
may be imposed, 
 In terms of paragraph 20A a penalty of 20% must be imposed for failure to submit a 
provisional tax estimate;113 and  
 In terms of paragraph 20(1) a penalty of 20% must be imposed for the understatement 
of a provisional tax estimate if the taxpayer incorrectly estimates the taxable income 
by a certain percentage. 
PAYE: 
In terms of section 213 of the Admin Act read with paragraph 6(1) of the Fourth Schedule to 
the ITA, SARS may impose a penalty if an employer fails to pay any number of employees’ tax 
for which the taxpayer is liable within the specified period for an amount equal to ten per 
cent of such unpaid amount. 
Furthermore, a penalty may be imposed in terms of section 213 read with paragraph 14(6) of 
the Fourth Schedule to the ITA for failure to submit a complete, accurate and reconciled 
EMP501 to SARS by the relevant due date.   
The penalty114 is levied for each month that the employer fails to submit a complete return 
which in total may not exceed 10 per cent of the total number of employees’ tax deducted or 
                                                          
113 This penalty was deleted with effect from 1 March 2015 
114 Paragraph 14(6) 
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withheld or which should have been deducted or withheld by the employer form the 
remuneration of the employees for the relevant period as described. 
In instances where the EMP501 is outstanding, penalties are calculated as a percentage 
ranging from 1% up to a maximum of 10% of the total PAYE payable per month in respect of 
a specific period outstanding.115  The penalty imposed may be proportionally remitted 
depending on the circumstances of each case and dependent on the degree of the relevant 
compliance.116    
Penalties are systematically levied and the penalty will recur if the taxpayer does not remedy 
the non-compliance that gave rise to the administrative non-compliance penalty by the same 
amount every month that the non-compliance is not remedied.  
VAT: 
SARS imposes a fixed amount penalty117 when it is satisfied that an amount of tax was not 
paid as and when it is required under the ITA.  As relates to VAT, SARS may impose a penalty 
equal to the percentage118 of the amount of the unpaid tax. 
A penalty equal to 10% is imposed by SARS when a vendor fails to pay VAT within the period 
allowed for payment.  The applicable penalty percentage, currently 10%, is regulated by the 
VAT Act.119  The imposition of the penalty is regulated by the Admin Act.120 
Furthermore, an understatement penalty121 may be imposed by SARS if the fiscus is 
prejudiced by the vendor’s conduct in reporting.  The understatement penalty is imposed if 
there is a shortfall, which is the difference between the correct amount of tax that should 
have been disclosed and the amount that was disclosed by the vendor in respect of a tax 
period.  
Accordingly, the fiscus will be prejudiced because a vendor122 - 
                                                          
115 Paragraph 14(6) of the ITA read together with section 213(1) of the Admin Act 
116 section 217 and section 218 of the Admin Act  
117 Section 217 and section 218 of the Admin Act 
118 As prescribed in the VAT Act  
119 Section 39 of the VAT Act 
120 Section 213 of the Admin Act 
121 Section 222(1) of the Admin Act  
122 Section 222(1) of the Admin Act  
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 Defaulted in rendering a return; 
 Filed a return but omitted something from that return; 
 Filed a return in which an incorrect statement was made. 
A vendor can however request for the remittance of the percentage-based administrative 
penalty.  SARS will grant the remittance if it is satisfied that the-  
 Amount involved is either less than R2 000, or the non-payment is a ‘first incidence’; 
 The vendor has reasonable grounds for the non-compliance; and  
 The incidence of non-payment has been remedied.123 
The percentage-based penalty may also be remitted if exceptional circumstances124 exist for 
the non-compliance. 
If SARS decided to disallow the request for remittance, the vendor may object to this 
decision.125 
4.1.7 Request for remittance  
A request for remittance is a method available to the taxpayer to request for the penalty 
levied in respect of any incidence of non-compliance to be waived and to dispute the 
imposition of the penalty.   
A taxpayer who is aggrieved by the imposition of the penalty, can apply for the remittance of 
the penalty to SARS on or before the date on which the payment of the penalty is due and in 
the relevant prescribed form and manner. 
If SARS does not allow the request, the taxpayer may object to the decision not to remit the 
penalty.126 
Section 215(1) states, 
                                                          
123 Section 217(3) of the Admin Act 
124 ‘Exceptional circumstances’ defined in section 218 of the Admin Act  
125 Section 224 of the Admin Act 
126 Section 215 of the Admin Act 
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“A person who is aggrieved by a ‘penalty assessment’ notice may, or before the date 
for payment in the ‘penalty assessment’, in the prescribed form and manner, request 
SARS to remit the ‘penalty’ in accordance with Part E. 
 (2) The ‘remittance request’ must include- 
 (a) a description of the circumstances which prevented the person from complying with 
the relevant obligation under a tax Act in respect of which the ‘penalty’ has been 
imposed; and 
(b) the supporting documents and information as may be required by SARS in the 
prescribed form. 
4.1.8 Remittance of a penalty in respect of nominal or ‘first incidence’ of non-
compliance 
Section 217 of the Admin Act provides for remittance of a non-compliance penalty where the 
non-compliance is in respect of a nominal or ‘first incidence’ of non-compliance. 
Section 217(1) states,  
 “If a ‘penalty’ has been imposed in respect of- 
(a) A ‘first incidence’ of non-compliance; or  
(b) An incidence of non-compliance described in section 210 if the duration of the non-
compliance is less than five business days, 
SARS may, in respect of a ‘penalty’ imposed under section 210 or 212, remit the 
‘penalty’, or a portion thereof if appropriate, up to an amount of R2 000 if SARS is 
satisfied that- 
(i) Reasonable grounds for the non-compliance exist; and  
(ii) The non-compliance in issue has been remedied. 
 (3) If a ‘penalty’ has been imposed under section 213, SARS may remit the ‘penalty’ or a 
portion thereof if SARS is satisfied that- 
(a) the ‘penalty’ has been imposed in respect of a ‘first incidence’ of non-compliance, 
or involved and amount of less than R2000; 
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(b) reasonable grounds for the non-compliance exist; and  
(c) the non-compliance in issue has been remedied.” 
Furthermore, section 208 defines a ‘first incidence’ as “an incidence of non-compliance by a 
person if no ‘penalty assessment’ under this Chapter was issued during the preceding 36 
months”.   
It is questionable what would happen if the taxpayer registered for income tax and the 
taxpayer’s income tax returns are outstanding for the current and previous years of 
assessment.  Both income tax returns are accordingly overdue and both had an amount to be 
paid which was not paid timeously.  In this case the percentage-based penalty was imposed 
in respect of both years of assessment.  The wording of section 217 is not clear and it could 
be interpreted that a taxpayer would only be able to request remittance in respect of the 
penalty imposed as relates to the first income tax return that was outstanding as that would 
fall within the request for remittance in respect of ‘first incidence’.  As the request for 
remittance in respect of ‘first incidence’, if applied strictly, can only be applicable to the failure 
to submit the first income tax return, would SARS allow for the request for remittance to be 
collectively considered as ‘first incidence’ as relates to the failure to submit the second 
income tax return timeously.  
Evidently, SARS’ powers in respect of remission under section 217 could be said to be limited 
to the ‘first incident’ of non-compliance.   
Further, uncertainty exists regarding whether the ‘first incidence’ of non-compliance refers 
to the first failure of submission of an income tax return or the first month of the failure of 
submission on the part of the taxpayer. 
So, although ‘first incidence’ is defined in the Admin Act it is still not clear how SARS will 
interpret scenarios as mentioned above where a taxpayer upon new income tax registration 
has two or more income tax returns outstanding.  It is necessary to provide further guidance 
in this respect for taxpayers to know how they are to approach the request for remittance in 





In respect of the objects of punishment it was evident in Chapter 2 that it is necessary for 
wrongdoers to be punished for their wrongdoings and that punishment is necessary as a 
preventative and punitive measure.  The incorrect application of punishment could lead to an 
imbalance and cause more harm than good.   
It was also evident that a clear legislative framework is important to ensure clarity and 
certainty. 
It is evident that the fixed amount and the percentage-based penalties provisions provide a 
clear legislative framework to taxpayers as there is no uncertainty or inconsistency in respect 
of the imposition of the penal provisions. 
There is a consistent combination of both elements (preventative and punitive) that is 
necessary to achieve the purpose of punishment and the purpose of the penal provisions 
which ultimately should align with each other to achieve the right outcome. 
The remittance of penalties imposed forms an integral part of the penalty regime as it 
provides for wrongdoers to obtain relief in certain circumstances.  This is ultimately a 
mechanism to ensure that the penalty regime operates within its true purpose, as pointed 
out in 3.6 above, and with the doctrine of punishment.  
In 2.1 it was evident that punishment is applied with the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer, 
however a very other important aspect of punishment is the determination of the extent of 
the punishment to be applied.  It was pointed out that humans are not all alike and that 
punishment should not only be determined by the nature of the wrongdoing but also by the 
nature of the wrongdoer. 
I briefly examined the courts powers in respect of sentencing and it was found that though 
there is no general legislation prescribing the courts on how to sentence and how much the 
offender should be sentenced, there are still limitations providing for a minimum and a 
maximum sentence. There are however limitations in respect of sentencing, a minimum and 
a maximum.   The wide discretion of the courts can be problematic as the same set of facts 
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could be presented to two different judges and two completely different outcomes could be 
achieved. 
The courts referred to a triad, which requires that the punishment should fit the wrongdoer 
as well as the wrongdoing, be fair to the state and to the wrongdoer blended with a measure 
of mercy. 
In the current provisions providing remittance in respect of penalties imposed there are some 
deficiencies.  There is no set of guidelines and the Commissioner has a very wide discretion.  
Taxpayers have no certainty as to what factors and circumstances would be considered or 
transparency in respect of the outcomes of other cases which have similar facts and 
circumstances.      
It is therefore evident that the provisions in respect of the remission of the penalties does not 
align with the doctrine of punishment. 
4.2 Understatement penalty (Chapter 16) 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The understatement penalty percentage provisions in Section 221 to 223 of the Admin Act 
predominantly targets serious noncompliance offences.  It specifically lists certain behaviour 
and conducts on the part of the taxpayer.  Such conduct includes elements of tax evasion. 
The Hong Kong penalty table127 provided South Africa with a base for the levying of penalties 
on the nature of the omission or the understatement of income or profit and included 
mitigating and aggravating factors that need to be considered when evaluating the specific 
cases at hand. 
The main purpose of the understatement penalty regime was the deterrence of non-
compliant reporting. 128 
                                                          
127 Inland Revenue Department of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.  2003.  
Section 82A of the Penalty policies 
128 Draft guide to understatement penalties (2017) 
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Though the understatement penalty percentage table was an improvement it is nevertheless 
necessary to examine and determine whether it is effective and whether it operates in the 
pursuance of the objects of punishment as identified in Chapter 2 above.   
In terms of Chapter 16 of the Admin Act a taxpayer may be liable for an understatement 
penalty because of certain behaviour demonstrated on the part of the taxpayer.  The extent 
of the understatement penalty depends on the type of the behaviour demonstrated. 
There are six types of behaviours and it is listed in the understatement penalty percentage 

























10% 20% 5% 0% 
(ii) Reasonable care not 
taken in completing 
return 
25% 50% 15% 0% 
(iii) No reasonable grounds 
for ‘tax position’ taken 
50% 75% 25% 0% 
(iv) Impermissible 
avoidance arrangement 
75% 100% 35% 0% 
(v) Gross negligence 100% 125% 50% 5% 
(vi) Intentional tax evasion 150% 200% 75% 10% 
 
The table above is the amended version of that what was originally announced and applied.130 
The purpose for this was to align the penalty percentages with similar penalty regimes of 
                                                          
129 Section 223(1) of the Admin Act 
130 1 October 2012 
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comparative tax jurisdictions.  This is but one of SARS’ initiatives to encourage compliance 
and to attain revenue targets.131   
The amendments were introduced by the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill132 and 
enacted as the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act.133  
The amendment has provided for a reduction in the understatement penalty rates in respect 
of behaviour as relates to a “substantial understatement”, “reasonable care not taken in 
completing a return” or where the taxpayer has “no reasonable grounds for the tax position 
taken”.  The penalty rates relating to the other behaviours has remained the same. 
The amendment provides that an understatement penalty shall not be levied in circumstances 
where the understatement arose because of a bona fide inadvertent error.134   
Taxpayers may request for the understatement penalty to be remitted in the prescribed 
format and manner.135  
4.2.2 Imposition of understatement penalties  
SARS has the discretion to impose an understatement penalty of up to 200% depending upon 
the behaviour of the taxpayer and the objective criteria listed in the specific table (refer to 
4.2.1 above). 
It is said to be aimed at ensuring consistent treatment of taxpayers in comparable 
circumstances.136 
An ‘understatement’ as defined in Chapter 16 means “any prejudice to SARS or the fiscus as 
a result of-  
(a) a default in rendering a return; 
(b) an omission from a return; 
(c) an incorrect statement in a return; 
                                                          
131 Memorandum on the objects of the Tax Administration Bill, 2011 
132 No 40 of 2013 (‘the TALAB’) 24 October 2013 
133 No 39 of 2013 (‘the TALAA’) 16 January 2014 
134 See discussions in 4.2.3 below. 
135 Section 224(1) of the Admin Act 
136 Memorandum on the objects of the Tax Administration Bill. 2011 
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(d) if no return is required, the failure to pay the correct amount of ‘tax’; or  
(e) an ‘’impermissible avoidance arrangement’.” 
An understatement penalty is calculated by applying the highest applicable understatement 
penalty percentage in the listed percentage table to the difference between the amount of 
tax properly chargeable for the relevant tax period and the amount of tax that would have 
been chargeable if the understatement were to be accepted. 
When the understatement penalty regime was ratified, SARS envisioned that the regime 
would be a method to punish delinquent taxpayers whose actions fall within any of the six 
misdemeanours of the definition of an understatement.137  
Depending on the taxpayer’s behaviour, the understatement penalty percentage ranges from 
a minimum of 5%, to a high of 200% in occurrences where the taxpayer has a recurrence of 
intentional tax evasion.  
The amendment also provides for events where more than one behavioural category may be 
present.  It is necessary to determine the behavioural category in respect of each 
understatement separately and not simply applying the highest penalty percentage to the 
total understatement. 
Prejudice to SARS or the fiscus:  
The definition of an ‘understatement’ contains the words ‘prejudice to SARS or the fiscus’, this 
creates uncertainty as the term ‘prejudice’ is not defined in the Admin Act.  One is then 
obliged to look at the ordinary dictionary meaning, which in itself creates uncertainty as to 
whether SARS is warranted to levy an understatement penalty. 
I can demonstrate by way of example that there is uncertainty and that clarification is 
necessary.   
Example:   
A taxpayer submits an income tax return and claims a deduction in respect of a travel 
allowance which results in a refund of R30 000 due to the taxpayer.  A few days later the 
                                                          
137 Section 223 of the Admin Act 
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taxpayer realizes that it erroneously overstated its kilometres which resulted in a greater 
deduction and informs SARS accordingly.  The refund should have been R15 000 and this was 
also the amount that was refunded to the taxpayer.   
Evidently, there are concerns that arise, such as whether SARS is justified in levying an 
understatement penalty even if it only paid out the actual refund due to the taxpayer. 
It is questionable whether SARS has been prejudiced in this instance, does the administrative 
action by SARS falls within the domain of ‘prejudice’? 
The meaning of ‘prejudice’ is to cause harm to someone.138  This could only be the case if SARS 
was at any given time at a disadvantage to the extent of the incorrect amount, in other words 
the difference between the correct amount refundable to the taxpayer and the amount that 
was ultimately refunded.  In this example, the correct amount was refunded to the taxpayer, 
therefore it is evident to say that there was no prejudice to SARS or the fiscus. 
Due to the absence of the direct definition of the word ‘prejudice’, it is questionable whether 
SARS should levy an understatement penalty when there is clearly no monetary prejudice to 
them.  Therefore, it would be welcomed if SARS could clarify its interpretation by way of an 
Interpretation Note, or if Government could possibly make changes to current legislation. 139 
The current view is that the understatement penalty regime was designed to safeguard SARS 
against any prejudice which would emanate from any one of the six actions which enforce an 
understatement and that results in an actual monetary prejudice and not an administrative 
prejudice.  
Burden of proof: 
In terms of the previous penalty regime,140 SARS invited the taxpayer to make suggestions as 
to the extent that the penalty should or should not be imposed. 
                                                          
138 Definition of prejudice means damage, detriment, disadvantage, harm, hurt, impairment, injustice, 
irreversible damage, loss, unfairness, wrong. Available:  https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/prejudice [2018, February 16] 
139 ENSafrica.2015. Understatement penalties. Integritax SAICA Newsletter 2418 Issue 189. Available:  
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2015/2418._Understatement_penalties.htm [2018, February 16] 
140 Section 76 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
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The regime previously lacked a purpose and objective differentiation and was mostly applied 
universally in all instances.  The highest percentage was levied irrespective of the behaviour 
on the part of the taxpayer. 
Another concern was that the Commissioner had the power to act as he deemed fit.  The 
taxpayer then faces an unregulated and very unpredictable process to motivate its reasons 
for remission of the penalty.   
Accordingly, it is evident that any such approach by SARS would be in direct contrast with the 
policy of the Admin Act.  
Section 102(2) of the Admin Act states-   
“Burden of proof – “(1) …… 
(2) The burden of proving whether an estimate under section 95 is 
reasonable or the facts on which SARS based the imposition of an 
understatement penalty under Chapter 16, is upon SARS.” Own 
emphasis added. 
After the amendment, section 102(2) now places the burden upon SARS to state the facts on 
which it has based the imposition of the understatement penalty. 
The appropriate manner is for SARS to inform the taxpayer that it relies on certain facts, 
adequate proof and accordingly intends to impose a certain rate of understatement penalties, 
allowing the taxpayer to make commentaries thereon.141 
In a published article142 it was pointed out that the issue is that SARS lacks an understanding 
of the structure and policy behind the understatement penalty regime and how it should 
correctly be construed and imposed. 
It is evident that there are still uncertainties regarding the practical application of the Admin 
Act and accordingly necessitates that SARS provide further clarification.   
                                                          
141 Van Manen, L. 2014. Understatement Penalties in hindsight. Available: 
http://www.thesait.org.za/news/180728/Understatement-Penalties-in-hindsight.htm [2018, February 16] 
142 Mazansky, E. Business Tax and Company Law Quarterly. Vol. 7. Issue 3 at 1-4. South Africa: Siber Ink. 
Available:  https://journals.co.za/content/btclq/7/3/EJC194781 [2018, February 16] 
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4.3 Investigating a ‘Bona fide’ inadvertent error 
It was announced by the Minister of Finance that the understatement penalty provisions 
would be amended to provide relief for incidences that arose because of bona fide errors.143  
After the amendment, an understatement penalty shall not be imposed in the event where 
an ‘understatement’ as defined results from a bona fide inadvertent error.144 
In 2.1 above I identified the four elements (retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation) that the punishment doctrine is made up of.  
Specifically, in respect of deterrence, it was found that its primary focus is on the prevention 
of future wrongdoings.  Specifically, in respect of a tax context the courts found that the 
punishment must fit the offence. 
It is therefore clear that if a penalty had to be imposed in respect of a bona fide inadvertent 
error that the penalty regime would not align with the doctrine of punishment. 
Therefore, the amendment is aligned with the objects of punishment as a bona fide error 
does not require any deterrence.   
Certain specified circumstances were identified in the draft memorandum on the objects of 
the TALAB145 that would be considered when determining if a ‘bona fide’ inadvertent error 
has been made.   
The way in which bona fide inadvertent errors would be assessed:146 
“In determining if the ‘understatement’ results from a ‘bona fide’ inadvertent error, a SARS 
official will generally have regard to the circumstances in which the errors were made as well 
as other factors, for example: 
 In the context of factual errors- 
 If the standard of care taken by the taxpayer in completing the return is commensurate 
with the taxpayer’s knowledge, education, experience and skill and the care a reasonable 
person in the same circumstances would have exercised;  
                                                          
143 The Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act, 2013 
144 Section 222(1) of the Admin Act  
145 The Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act, 2013 




 The size or quantum, nature and frequency of the error; 
 Whether a similar error was made in a return submitted during the preceding years; or 
 In the case of an arithmetical error, whether the taxpayer had procedures in place to detect 
arithmetical errors. 
 In the case of a legal interpretive error, whether- 
 The relevant provision of a tax Act is generally regarded as complex; 
 The taxpayer took steps to understand it including following available explanatory 
material or making reasonable enquiries; or  
 The taxpayer relied on information that, although incorrect or misleading, came from 
reputable sources and a reasonable person in the same circumstances would be likely to 
find the relevant information complex.”  
 
In the final version of the explanatory memorandum, the criteria previously mentioned in the 
draft was removed. 
Clause 2.75 of the final Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws 
Amendment Bill 2013 reads as follows: 
“The proposed amendment will apply with effect from 1 October 2012, but will also apply to 
understatement made in a return before 1 October 2012.  Due to the broad range of possible 
errors, the proposal to define the term “bona fide inadvertent error” has the potential to 
inadvertently exclude deserving cases and include undeserving cases.  SARS will, however, 
develop guidance in this regard for the use of taxpayers and SARS officials.” Own emphasis 
added. 
One would think that the ‘guidance’ would take the form of the issuing of an interpretation 
note, however after a few years SARS has still has not provided any ‘guidance’.   
In practice147 it appears that because the SARS officials lack the means in which to apply the 
bona fide inadvertent error exclusion, they are simply just ignoring it altogether.  This 
ignorance does not mirror the elements of the true purpose of the penalty regime as it is does 
not ensure fairness, transparency and effectiveness.148 
                                                          
147 Bowmans. 2017. Penalties: the application of “bona fide inadvertent error”. Integritax SAICA Newsletter 
2588 Issue 210. Available:  
https://www.saica.co.za/Integritax/2017/2588._Penalties__the_application_of_%E2%80%9Cbona_fide_ina
dvertent_error%E2%80%9D.htm [2018, February 16] 
148 Memorandum on the objects of the Tax Administration Bill. 2011 para 2 at 179 
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The bona fide inadvertent error exclusion from understatement penalties has been 
specifically sanctioned to ensure fairness and to illuminate the unjustified and undeserved 
imposition of understatement penalties.  Taxpayers have the right to the proper application 
of the law.   
The meaning of bona fide inadvertent error is not defined in the Admin Act.  The courts149 
therefore turn to the dictionary meaning of the words which concludes that ‘bona fide’ 
inadvertent error has to be an innocent misstatement by a taxpayer on his or her return, 
resulting in an understatement, while acting in good faith and without the intention to 
deceive”. 
Bona fide inadvertent error essentially applies to instances that occurred because of an act or 
omission which has not been intended.  In this instance, the understatement is a result of an 
unintended mistake and accordingly the Commissioner will not be sanctioned to levy an 
understatement penalty. 
SARS would have to discredit the taxpayer’s version of the facts and convince a court, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the facts provided by the taxpayer in defence is not reliable.150     
In ITC 1377151 the taxpayer believed that an amount received constituted a capital amount 
and therefore did not include it in his tax return as gross income.  The Court held that the 
taxpayer omitted the amount under the bona fide belief that it was not taxable and 
accordingly the Tax Court ordered the remittance of the total amount of the penalty that was 
imposed. 
The above discussion highlights the necessity for SARS to further clarify and provide the 
necessary guidance in respect of the application of the law. 
4.4 Investigating the percentage table and certain specific behaviours  
As referred to in 4.2.1 above, section 223 of the Admin Act contains the understatement 
penalty percentage table that determines what percentage, based on certain behaviour on 
                                                          
149 ABC Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CSARS Case number ITI 13772 Available: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Judgments/LAPD-DRJ-TC-2016-10%20-
%20TCIT%2013772%20WC%204%20November%202016.pdf [2018, February 16] 
150 Section 102(2) of the Admin Act 
151 45 SATC 221 at 229 
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the part of the taxpayer, will be imposed in the event of an understatement as defined.  I have 
limited the investigation of the behaviours of the understatement penalty percentage table 
to that of ‘gross negligence’ and ‘reasonable grounds’ as these can be very widely interpreted 
and are more commonly present in practice.  
4.4.1 Gross negligence 
I have examined a bona fide inadvertent error separately at point 4.3 above as it does not 
form part of the understatement percentage table.    
The ‘gross negligence’ behaviour on the part of taxpayer’s forms part of the understatement 
percentage table and will be discussed accordingly. 
The term ‘gross negligence’ is not defined in the Admin Act, yet we can find some guidance 
on its meaning in law other than tax law.152   
It should be noted that there is a difference between gross negligence and ordinary 
negligence.  It was held that it is non-consciousness of risk-taking that distinguishes gross 
negligence from ordinary negligence.153 It was further held that a person’s conduct in relation 
to risk that a person is conscious of can depart drastically from the standard of the reasonable 
person that it can amount to gross negligence.154 
In considering gross negligence in relation to a person that intentionally takes a risk, the 
conduct in question must involve a departure from a standard of the reasonable person to 
such an extent that it may be categorized as extreme complete ignorance of mind and must 
be demonstrated.155 
One can interpret the meaning of ‘gross negligence’ as a mindful and intended disregard of 
the need to use reasonable care, which is expected to cause injury or damage to persons, 
                                                          
152 Van der Zwan, P. 2003. A taxpayer’s right to manage its exposure.  Cape Town: South African Institute of 
Tax Practitioners. Available:  http://www.thesait.org.za/news/115961/A-taxpayers-right-to-manage-its-
exposure.htm [2017, November 14] and South Africa (Department of Industries) v Fibre Spinners and 
Weaves (Pty) Ltd (1977) (2) SA 324 (D) 
153 S v Van Zyl 1969 (1) SA 553 (A)  
154 CSAR v Adlington & Co 1906 TS 964 at 973 (1906) 
155 Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v MV ‘Stella Tingas’ and Another (378/01) [2002] ZASCA 145  
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property or both.  If compared to ordinary negligence, it is behaviour that is extreme and not 
just a case of failure to take reasonable care.  
Therefore, it can be said that ordinary negligence differs from gross negligence in relation to 
the degree of the inattentiveness of the taxpayer.  Accordingly, both differ from wilful 
conduct, as wilful is reasonably considered to cause harm.  It is important that we make this 
distinction, as contributory negligence is an absence of care combined with certain conduct 
causing harm. 
The actions of the taxpayer therefore play a vital role in categorizing whether a certain act 
falls within the conduct of gross negligence.   In short one can define gross negligence as an 
indifference to, and a blatant violation of, a legal duty with respect to the rights of others.  
As no specific guidance, has been provided as to what would define a case of gross negligence 
in a tax context, the interpretation by the Commissioner of what constitutes gross negligence 
is left open.   
It is difficult to ensure that when a specific behaviour is present that it would be interpreted 
in the manner it ought to.  If no guidance is provided it would be difficult to ensure that the 
stated objects in the Objects of the Memorandum would be attained.    
4.4.2 Reasonable grounds  
The term ‘reasonable grounds’ is not defined in the Admin Act and it does not determine what 
grounds presented by the taxpayer will be considered to be reasonable. 
There are no parameters laid down in law that provides us with an absolute standard to 
determine what actually constitutes ‘reasonableness’.  Every matter is to be considered 
independently and will be decided upon the particular circumstances of each matter. 
The taxpayer is to prove that reasonable grounds for the non-compliance exist and that the 
taxpayer did not act unreasonably.  
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Taxpayers have been provided with the test in respect of whether a reasonable ground for 
the ‘tax position’ was taken by the taxpayer.156  In terms of this test it is not necessary that 
the position taken by the taxpayer must be a ‘better view’ than that of the Commissioner, it 
should just as likely be correct as it can be incorrect.   
It was found157in an Australia matter that the actual intention of the person said to be at fault 
was not relevant as the test for establishing whether reasonable grounds is present is an 
objective one.  It is not in question whether the taxpayer has tried to act with reasonable care 
it is however relevant that, on an objective examination, reasonable care has been shown.  
Accordingly, it can be said that the test does not depend on the actual intentions of the 
taxpayer. 
An understatement penalty percentage should be imposed where the taxpayer’s position 
could not be reasonably argued.  Therefore, taxpayers must not only take reasonable care; it 
must also attain a reasonably arguable tax position to conclude that the circumstances at 
hand would less likely be correct than incorrect.158   
In terms of the SARS short guide159 certain factors should be considered to evaluate the tax 
position taken by the taxpayer; such as whether an amount, transaction, event or item is 
taxable; whether an amount or item is deductible or may be set off; a lower rate of tax than 
the maximum applicable to that class of taxpayer, transaction, event or item applies; or if an 
amount qualifies as a reduction of tax payable.  Where any shortfall arises due to a 
substantive disagreement concerning the interpretation and application of a provision, the 
understatement penalty percentage will be imposed if the position of the taxpayer is not 
based on reasonable grounds or facts. 
                                                          
156 A New Tax System (Tax Administration) Bill (No. 2) 2000 Available: 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004B00704/Revised%20Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text 
[2017, October 21] 
157 Australian tax Office. 2008. Miscellaneous Taxation Ruling MT2008/1 information paper. Available:  
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=MXR/MT20081/NAT/ATO/00001   
       [2017, August 7].  
158 A New Tax System (Tax Administration) Bill (No. 2) 2000 Available: 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004B00704/Revised%20Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text 
[2017, October 21] 
159 SARS. SARS Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act 2011. 2013. SARS Version 2. Available: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-TAdm-G01%20-
%20Short%20Guide%20to%20the%20Tax%20Administration%20Act%202011%20-
%20External%20Guide.pdf [2017, November 14] 
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It is clear that the purpose is not to levy a penalty when the Commissioner disagrees with a 
position taken by the taxpayer and interprets it differently to the taxpayer.  It is to attach a 
penalty in specific instances where a taxpayer unreasonably undertakes its position.  
In 2.2.2 reference was made to two different types of deterrence, specific and general 
deterrence.  In a tax context, specific deterrence is required to ensure that taxpayers are 
appropriately punished for their wrongdoings and to prevent the wrongdoing from 
reoccurring.  I have also previously established that the punishment must fit the wrongdoing.   
Yet again it is crucial that the penal provisions align with the objective of punishment as any 
deficit could lead to injustice.       
4.5 Remittance procedure  
In the event of the imposition of an understatement penalty in respect of a ‘substantial 
understatement’ SARS must remit an understatement penalty in certain circumstances:  SARS 
must remit the understatement penalty if it is satisfied that the taxpayer made full disclosure 
of the arrangement that gave rise thereto by no later than the date of the return,160 and if it 
is satisfied that the taxpayer was in possession of an opinion issued from a registered 
independent tax practitioner, by no later than the date the return was due and that it was 
based upon full disclosure of the complete facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
arrangement.161  The opinion also needs to confirm that based upon the facts the position of 
the taxpayer will more likely than not be upheld if the matter had to proceed to court. 
The subsequent amendment permits for taxpayers who submitted their returns prior to the 
commencement of the Admin Act to rely on an opinion that was obtained after the 
submission of the return.   
In a published article,162 it was pointed out that the court163 has previously held that where a 
taxpayer had received professional advice there were ‘reasonable grounds’ for tax position 
                                                          
160 Section 223(3)(a) of the Admin Act 
161 Section 223(3)(b) of the Admin Act  
162 Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr. 2015. Mitigation of penalties and interest. Integritax SAICA Newsletter 2398 Issue 
186. Available: https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2015/2398._Mitigation_of_penalties_and_interest.htm 
[2018, February 16] 
163 United States of America case of Estate of Spruill v Commissioner 88 TC 1197 (1987) 
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taken’ and accordingly it cannot be said that ‘reasonable care was not taken in completing 
the return’.  
4.5.1 Discretion to remit penalties 
As is evident from the Admin Act, the discretion to remit penalties rests with the 
Commissioner.  How are taxpayers assured that this discretion is exercised within the ambit 
of the doctrine of punishment? 
It can be extremely costly for a taxpayer to object to a penalty or the decision not to remit 
the penalty.  This is contradictive to the purpose of the Admin Act when it initiated the new 
sections, as the aim was to reduce the costs of tax administration in the medium to longer 
term.   
Taxpayers are not assured that the Commissioner exercises its discretion in such a manner 
that it considers the true purpose of penalties, as deterrent, and not for example as a 
mechanism for collecting additional revenue.  
SARS does not disclose to taxpayers what portion of the raised revenue consists of additional 
tax and non-compliance penalties.  
The Admin Act seeks to achieve a balance between the powers and duties of SARS and the 
rights and obligations of taxpayers as this balance would contribute to the equity and fairness 
of tax administration in general.  Furthermore, it also seeks to ensure administrative fairness 
and more effective remedies.   
Currently there is no assurance to taxpayers that the administrative fairness and effectiveness 
of the remedies are achieved within the current penalty regime and SARS’ discretion to remit 
penalties.   
Section 222 places an obligation upon the taxpayer to pay an understatement penalty as 
determined.  In this regard SARS is obligated to impose the penalty if the relevant 
requirements have been met.  This is somewhat in contrast with the repealed section 76 as 
SARS previously had the discretion to impose a penalty up to 200%.  
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4.5.2 Decision by a Tax Court 
Section 129(3) of the Admin Act states- 
“In the case of an appeal against an understatement penalty imposed by SARS under a tax 
Act, the tax court must decide the matter on the basis that the burden of proof is upon SARS 
and may reduce, confirm or increase the understatement penalty.” 
In terms of section 129(3) the Tax Court evaluates SARS’ application of the table.  The Tax 
Court may increase or decrease the understatement penalty as it deems suitable.  Based on 
the evidence available, the court may also decide which behavioural category is more 
appropriate.   
It appears that the courts’ abilities are more exhaustive than that of the Commissioner and 
apply more effort in considering whether the understatement penalty should be remitted or 
not.  This should be the default way the remittance should be considered as this aligns 
perfectly with the policy of the penalty regime and ultimately the purpose of punishment.    
Therefore, it would be recommended that to achieve optimal administrative fairness and to 
coincide with the purpose of the penalty regime, the Commissioner should have less 
discretion and even in some instances no discretion at all.   
We can therefore conclude that where wrongdoers can determine a trend or a fashion in 
which the Commissioner normally exercises its discretion, it could possibly leave the door 
open for a certain degree of manipulation.  
It appears from the discussions above that when a matter proceeds to court and is to be 
decided by the courts, only then does a proper investigation of the facts and circumstances 
take place. 
The reason for this seems to be that the courts consider the specific elements necessary to 
deliver a fair and equitable outcome in a matter, in other words considering the elements 
necessary for a fair trial and determining the sufficient punishment to prevent future 
wrongdoing, rather than simply applying a general approach and standard outcome. 
Though there should be a more detailed criterion for the imposition of a penalty, it would be 
recommended that it be considered that the discretion to remit penalties be delegated to an 
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independent third party.  This party can thoroughly without ‘prejudice’ evaluate the 
circumstances of each case and decide whether to remit the penalty or not. 
Only in this fashion can one be assured that there are no tainted elements that arbitrarily 
influence any decision to remit or not to remit a penalty. 
In the alternative, a more exhaustive procedure which covers widespread scenarios of non-
compliance, such as was present in the draft Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax 
Administration Bill, 2011 should be published. 
4.6 VDP  
The Admin Act provides a permanent framework for taxpayers to obtain relief by voluntarily 
disclosing instances of administrative non-compliance and understatements.164   The relief 
contained in this provision is however limited to 100% relief in respect of an administrative 
non-compliance penalty that was or may be imposed under Chapter 15 (excluding a penalty 
for late submission of a return).  The relief is in respect of any understatement penalty 
referred to in column 5 or 6 of the understatement percentage table, SARS will also not 
proceed with a criminal prosecution. 
Consideration is given to circumstances where the Commissioner discovers any omission or 
non-disclosure during an investigation.  This was evident in ITC 1351165  where it was said,  
“If this investigation had never been made then presumably the understatement of income 
would never have come to light, and the appellant would have evaded tax.  Mr. Marais is, in 
our view correct when he says that a high standard of diligence is required of the taxpayer in 
the rendering of his returns, because the Commissioner is entirely dependent upon that 
information for the purpose of making the assessment.” 
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to disclose accurate information on a tax return.  
The VDP regime has been created for taxpayers who voluntarily approach the Commissioner 
to request to rectify any default.   
                                                          
164 Section 225 of the Admin Act 
165 44 SATC 58 at 63 
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A sense of fairness is achieved with this regime as it is ensured that the punishment fits the 
offence.  The degree of punishment only extends here to the instances where the 
Commissioner discovers the non-disclosure and even then, the Commissioner gives the 
benefit of the doubt and imposes appropriate penalties.  The taxpayer is still provided with 
an opportunity of stating the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the omission or non-
disclosure. 
The VDP regime clearly aligns with the doctrine of punishment as it contains all the important 
factors.  There is certainty and the processes are applied to ensure that the punishment fits 
the wrongdoing.   
4.7 Conclusion 
To clarify and resolve the concerns with the current penalty regime it is necessary for National 
Treasury to provide specific definitions for the relevant behaviours stated in the 
understatement penalty percentage table. 
Once the above process has been simplified and made accessible to taxpayers it will leave less 
room for alternative interpretation and/or any manipulation.   
In conclusion, taxpayers should take the necessary steps to avoid exposure to 
understatement penalties as far as possible.  One way in which they can opt to do this is to 
make voluntary disclosure of understatements prior to receiving a notice of audit from SARS.   
Taxpayers can also acquire an opinion from registered tax practitioners in aid of avoiding a 
substantial understatement penalty.   
This unfortunately has a cost attached to it, which is in contrast with the aim of the Admin 
Act which endeavours to lighten the burden of administration and cost to the taxpayer.  
In respect of the remission of penalties, the wide discretion afforded to the Commissioner 
does not align with the doctrine of punishment as it neglects to adhere to the various 
elements that make up the objects of punishment.  
It does not provide certainty and does not currently ensure fairness.  There is no assurance to 
taxpayers that the punishment fits the wrongdoing. 
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CHAPTER 5:  Conclusion  
5.1 Summary  
The main purpose of this research was to determine the true nature and purpose of the penal 
system.  Furthermore, to determine whether the penal system operates and coincides with 
the philosophy of punishment, in other words acts as a deterrent for wrongdoers.  
To achieve the research objective of this study it was necessary to do a review of the history 
of the purpose of punishment166, to do a brief overview of the history of the penal system and 
a review of the penal system that is currently operative. 





Retribution was found to be focused on passed offences which supports the courts practice:  
the punishment must fit the crime.  The other categories, deterrence; rehabilitation and 
incapacitation were found to be focused on the future, in other words focused on preventing 
future wrongdoings. 
It was evident from case law that the South African courts specifically acknowledged the role 
of deterrence as a very important objective in the determination of the appropriate 
sentencing for wrongdoers.    
In a tax context, it is important that a penal system should act as a specific deterrent rather 
than a general deterrent to prevent any future wrongful activities.  For a penalty levying 
system to truly operate as an effective penal system there must be a suitable framework and 
the punishment must fit the wrongdoing committed, effectively it must align with the 
doctrine of punishment. 
                                                          
166 Chapter 2 
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In Chapter 3, I reviewed the history of the penal provisions and it was evident that the current 
penal provisions in the Admin Act has been a step in the right direction.  The understatement 
penalty percentage provisions in the Admin Act introduced significant changes in respect of 
the way in which penalties are to be levied as the previous penal provisions contained no set 
guidelines that regulated the imposition of additional taxes and penalties.  
The Admin Act was enacted to consolidate all tax administrative provisions into a single piece 
of legislation and has provided taxpayers with some much-needed guidance in the tax 
administration process.  The penal provisions have undergone a great transformation since it 
was initially initiated in the ITA versus the current penal provisions in the Admin Act.  There 
have been many amendments to the penal provisions to ensure that fairness, effectiveness 
and equality are improved and maintained in respect of both the taxpayers and the revenue 
authorities.  
In Chapter 4 I examined the penalty provisions under sections 221 to 223 of the Admin Act, 
also referred to as the understatement penalty percentages provisions and it became 
apparent that the purpose of the penalty regime is not in the pursuance of the doctrine of 
punishment and accordingly in some instances ineffective, or merely incorrectly labelled. 
In respect of the remittance of penalties, SARS has the authority to remit penalties but this is 
only in certain circumstances and it has become evident that there are deficiencies in this 
regard which should be addressed as there is a responsibility on SARS to conduct its business 
in a fair and just manner.      
To determine whether the research objective has been addressed, one has to determine 
whether the individual research objectives have been met, namely: 
(i) The review of prior legislative provisions prior to the enactment of the Tax Admin 
Act,  
(ii) The evaluation of the effectiveness of the current penal system of the Tax Admin 
Act and to identify any possible deficiencies with the application and 
interpretation of the provisions by the Commissioner.  The review conducted in 
Chapter 4 reveals and highlights that certain behaviours referred to in the 
understatement percentage tables contained in the Tax Admin Act, are not 
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defined and causes much uncertainty.  Likewise, there are uncertainties in respect 
of the request for remission of the penalties levied, as relates to the extent to 
which a ‘first incidence’ could be applied and to what extent the discretion to remit 
penalties should rest with the Commissioner. The result of the application of the 
provisions by SARS causes much confusion.  Factually, the Commissioner, the 
courts and the taxpayers will not interpret certain behaviour and provisions of the 
Admin Act in the same manner.  By examination and review of these behaviours it 
was evident that most of the behaviours that are not defined could to an extent 
be defined by the application of case law and publications on the interpretations 
of these behaviours.  The review also revealed that when an understatement 
penalty is levied certain additional factors need to be considered, which are 
referred to as ‘behaviours’ and unfortunately these are also not defined in the 
Admin Act.  SARS has attempted to provide guidance in respect of the relevant 
behaviours meanings with the publication of the SARS Short guide to the Tax 
Admin Act, however it still does not satisfy the deficiencies.  The review in Chapter 
4 makes it evident that future amendments are undoubtedly still required.  Having 
said that it is apparent that the enactment and the application of the 
understatement penalty percentage provisions in the Admin Act do contain some 
of the elements required to act as a deterrent for wrongdoers and is an 
improvement, however guidance for both taxpayers and SARS officials are still very 
much needed. 
(iii) The literature review in Chapter 2 identified the four elements of the main purpose 
of punishment namely retribution; deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation. 
The main element that is relevant to a tax penal system is deterrence.  In respect 
of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 it became evident that the main purpose of the penalty 
regime appears to be that of deterrence, to prevent and deter taxpayers and to 
provide certainty, so that they know what penalties are imposed and in respect of 
what circumstances it is to be imposed.  In Chapter 4 it become evident that there 
are certain misalignments as relates to the doctrine of punishment and the 
purpose of the penal system.  The Commissioner with its discretion to impose or 
remit penalties needs to consider the elements as the disregarding of the 
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essentials could result in the disproportion of the purpose of punishment and 
ultimately result in arbitration.   
5.2 Recommendation  
The findings of this research study have revealed that: 
 The enactment of the penal provisions in the Admin Act only partially achieves the 
philosophy of the doctrine of punishment and,  
 In instances where the penal provisions do achieve the objects of punishment, it 
appears that the application thereof is not consistently applied in practice.   
The penal levying system in the Admin Act has been an improvement on the past penalty 
provisions as is evident in Chapter 3.  However, despite the more favourable and fair outcome 
achieved by the penal provisions in the Admin Act, the research concludes that more specific 
guidance and measures in respect of the application of the penal provisions are necessary.  
The behaviours listed in the understatement penalty percentage table are not defined and 
creates the need for further improvement. Though changes have been made since the 
implementation thereof it still requires further revisions. 
I submit that the application of the penal provisions is not consistently applied in practice and 
it is recommended that the administrators of the legislation be better equipped in respect of 
the application of the penal provisions or that the processes should be changed to address 
the misalignment of the application of the penal provisions. 
Having identified the essential issues in section 221 to 223 of the Admin Act the following 
recommendations are made: 
(i) Proper definitions of the behaviours in these sections should be provided by 
National Treasury.  The definitions could be clarified by way of publications, case 
law and amendment to the Admin Act. 
(ii) Currently the discretion to remit the penalties rests with the Commissioner.  It is 
recommended that the administrators of the legislation be provided with more 
guidance or alternatively that the decision be outsourced or reviewed by an 
independent source to ensure that each case be considered upon its own facts and 
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circumstances.  Taxpayers can then be assured that the application of the penal 
system operates within its true purpose in other words to act as deterrent and not 
used as a mechanism to obtain tax revenue.  
It is clear from the above that further research is necessary to achieve the ultimate balance 
of fairness and effectiveness in the understatement penalty provisions under the Admin Act 
and to ensure that the penal provisions align with the doctrine of punishment. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The following important factors was evident in Chapter 2:   
 Penalties should be governed by clear legal rules 
 Purpose of punishment is to punish the wrongdoer 
 Punishment must be appropriately applied to prevent future wrongdoings in other 
words act as deterrent 
 The extent of punishment to be applied is important as the incorrect application of 
punishment can lead to an imbalance and unfairness 
The fact that most of the behaviours and conducts in the understatement penalty percentage 
table are not defined, creates ambiguity.  The behaviours of the taxpayers play a vital role in 
determining an understatement penalty and SARS has not provided any form of guidance or 
communication of the way they will determine the taxpayers’ behaviour.  It is therefore 
difficult to align the penal provision with the objects of punishment.    
There are instances where the penal provisions do align with the objects of punishment 
however, it appears that in practice there is a misalignment with the application of the 
provisions.   
The misalignment in practice could be due to ignorance on the part of the administrators of 
legislation or could in some instances be ascribed to be part of a revenue raising mechanism.  
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